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**INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
MASTERS RESEARCH REPORT**

SUPERVISOR: LARRY BENJAMIN

TOPIC:

**Valuable Lessons from two different
situations: C.O.D.E.S.A. versus Oslo, could
techniques from South Africa assist conflict
resolution in Israel/Palestine**

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CHAPTER 1:

“The Path To The New South Africa”

The Israeli/Palestinian conflict has been raging for decades. Factors such as religion, culture and two different peoples trying to co-exist in the same region have left casualties on both sides. Just as in the Middle Eastern Region, South Africa during the apartheid years had many of the same problems with two separate people in the midst of a constant battle. South Africa, in what can only be described as partly miraculous, was able to emerge from the struggle with a grace and dignity that may provide insight for the Israeli /Palestinian situation to perhaps follow suit.

Chapter One:

“The Path To The New South Africa”

Apartheid South Africa was an era of degradation and suffering amongst the non white communities due to a system enforced by the Nationalist government restricting almost all the civil rights and freedoms of non white communities. South Africa’s emergence from those dark times can be described as miraculous, and the C.O.D.E.S.A. process must be given massive credit for what it achieved and in fact prevented. The negotiation process must be carefully examined to determine what methods were used in order to bring about such a peaceful transition, and those who were involved and constructed the process of change that could have brought civil war, but rather a transition that brought a divided nation together.

The Events Leading Up To The Negotiations

The process of C.O.D.E.S.A. officially began in 1991¹ but the prelude was a succession of secretive talks and pre-emptive actions that led up to the actual C.O.D.E.S.A. negotiations. Talks between Nelson Mandela and P.W. Botha were held as far back as 1986² Indicating that the process was both lengthy and compartmentalised. If at this stage all parties were included, it is felt the results would have been a certain failure. Years and years of oppression and hostility needed careful

¹ Meer, F. The Codesa File, Madiba Publishers, Durban, 1993. Pge. 33

² Ibid. Pge. 9

management between a select few, if there would be any hope of success, and this is exactly what took place.

Small steps that would later lead to phenomenal achievements.

Secret talks were held between Nelson Mandela and The National Intelligence Service represented and led by Dr. Neil Barnard and his Deputy Director General Mr. Mike Louw in 1987,³ followed then by Mandela and the State President P.W. Botha meeting. This so called testing the water was essential to evaluate whether or not it would be possible to have successful talks or even whether it would be possible to begin to pull the country out of the mess it was in, peacefully. This clandestine process may very well have prevented what was taking place from becoming a media frenzy, which in its own right had the ability to destroy a negotiation process and allowed this careful quiet engagement which did not unnecessarily get the entire country involved at this point was perhaps a brilliant strategic diplomatic move.

In September 1989 F.W. de Klerk assumed office as state president and he began to try to establish relationships with the International community.⁴ On the 3rd of December 1991, Nelson Mandela mirrored these objectives and announced at the United Nations General Assembly that “The News South Africa will seek to normalise its relations with the rest of the world and gain full integration into the Community Of Nations.”⁵ Both de Klerk and Mandela seemed to know very well what needed to be done in order to bring about change and they both rallied jointly and severely to do so. de Klerk had numerous meetings with Nelson Mandela and formed a strong trusting relationship with him.⁶ A relationship that proved essential to the transition process. They had a healthy respect for each other and the views of the other, and through this they led by example.

³ Retrieved Online At: http://www.iss.co.za/index.php?link_id=21&slink_id=2945&link_type=12&slink_type=12&templ_id=
Date Retrieved: 11/16/2009

⁴ Meer, F. *Op. Cit* Pge. 21

⁵ Barber, J. *Mandela's World The International Dimension Of South Africa's Political Revolution*. James Currey Limited, 2004. Pge. 58.

⁶ Meer, F. *Op. Cit* Pge. 22

The president also began to implement the idea of reforms.⁷ In February 1990 de Klerk unbanned the African National Congress and started the process of releasing political prisoners.⁸ Prisoners such as Walter Sisulu one of the pioneers of the struggle, a man imprisoned for life at the Rivonia trials⁹ who blatantly went against the apartheid government by broadcasting messages for the A.N.C. from secret radio stations was released. Men that were regarded as “terrorists” by the oppressive regime were now free, indicating massive change in political ideologies. Changes that acted as the supports for the bridge that would later be built.

These moves sent out the belief that change truly was in the air. Acts of good faith that further enabled trust between to previously vehemently opposing parties to take place. What could now be seen were the early signs of a democracy taking place with the essential element of a truly multi-party system. After years of suffocation the A.N.C. was finally allowed to exist in the open. These events and the release of Nelson Mandela after twenty - seven years in prison were monumental milestones that laid the path for the success that can be seen today.

de Klerk took vital steps in order to bring about a functional South Africa. Re-entering the International community was essential both to gain assistance from outside parties, but integral for South Africa to function after a transition was complete. It seemed that de Klerk realised the enormity of the changes that needed to take place but also realised that they needed to be made gradually and progressively and he made them in a carefully thought out structured way.

First, by having the multitude of talks with Mandela who would later lead the A.N.C., forming a relationship with him, then unbanning his party. This ensured the A.N.C. and the South African government would eventually be able to engage in negotiations, as the two leaders were already on very good terms. Laying foundations carefully before taking the huge steps that needed to be taken. “Separate Amenities Act was

⁷ Loc. Cit.

⁸ Ibid. Pge 23

⁹ Silverman, M. Bauer, C. Great Romances Of Our Time, “Walter and Albertina Sisulu” Sunday Times, Millennium Souvenir 2 January 2000.

scrapped on November 16th 1989, the beaches were declared open to all races”¹⁰ de Klerk began unbanning the other political parties in 1990 and began slowly changing the way the country had been run for so many years. Moves such as this pulled the country out of its old ways slowly, and it is felt that this was the most sensible way to do it.

If every law was changed at once, anarchy may have broken out. An adaption needed to take place, not a process that changed everything at once, as this would not have worked. One feels that these meetings and assessments were paramount in paving the way for the success of the negotiations that began to take place almost two years later. The massive amounts of sensitivities and strained relationships often coupled with extreme hatred of the parties for each other needed a method that would attempt to build a bridge as it were, develop a relationship that could bloom into full blown negotiations.

“With the steps the government has taken,” de Klerk said “It has proven its good faith and the table is laid for sensible leaders to begin talking about a new dispensation”¹¹ This seemed to be in tune with the entire process. Sensible and logical steps whilst maintaining faith about positive change, but keeping an agenda and path with realistic goals and a structured pattern.

Mandela stated: “The point which must be clearly understood is that the struggle is not over; negotiations themselves are a theatre of struggle, subject to advances and reverses as any other form of struggle.”¹² Both the leaders relaying similar rhetoric, both acknowledged that what was taking place was indeed positive and they made this point known, but they maintained a mature stance that did not allow them to get ahead of themselves realising that the process would be long, and there would be problems and this was only the beginning of a long and testing process..

Once the consensus between the main parties involved was reached that negotiations could take place, only then was public opinion used.¹³ This eliminated the threat that

¹⁰ Op.Cit. Pge. 22.

¹¹ Loc. Cit.

¹² Barber, J. Op.Cit. Pge. 57

¹³ Op. Cit. www.iss.co.za.

if negotiations were not possible at this stage the entire country would not be involved in violent protests and disruptions that could have delayed the process for many years. Diplomacy and negotiations one feels are like a carefully composed symphony and these initial notes played by the parties involved were harmonious.

Official Negotiations began between the African National Congress and the South African government on May the 4th 1990,¹⁴ but by this stage the advantage of knowing that negotiations could be possible were already present, giving the process a massive push in the right direction, and with foundations already laid, the negotiations now had a platform on which to function properly. “The Groote Schuur Minute” which was an agreement between the parties to address the violence and intimidation that existed in South Africa, as well as indemnity for returning exiles and the release of political prisoners¹⁵ were agreed upon. What can be seen were steps taking place that made logical sense. The parties involved were learning to walk before they could run. Instead of aiming to end all violence and have free and fair elections immediately, the elements that would be necessary for that to take place were addressed first. This left little room for gaps to develop, and a structured process of addressing all the issues in an order that would allow an eventual conflict resolution were to take place.

This also built up a sense of trust between the parties, an essential component implicit for a stable, effective and permanent conflict resolution scenario. The A.N.C. was perhaps beginning to see that if those who resisted the apartheid system would be freed and those in exile could return without prosecution, that change really was taking place. The South African government in turn could see from this that by the non violent reactions during these steps that a peaceful agreement and settlement could be reached. These steps between the parties were allowing for the proverbial bridge to be built. Slowly examining one another, the two parties began to form a relationship that revealed the possibility that a non - violent resolution could be reached.

¹⁴ Meer, F. *Op. Cit.* Pge. 27

¹⁵ Loc. Cit.

Following the Groote Schuur Minute came the Pretoria Minute which contained the agreement to suspend the armed struggle and military wing (Umkhonto we Sizwe) of the A.N.C. This was a vital and paramount point, a watershed moment as the military wing was established mainly because negotiations were not allowed to take place. Being suspended indicated the further progress towards peaceful talks between the parties.¹⁶ What was taking place was careful diplomatic procedures that were not leaving any points out, in a sense that every threat that could disrupt the process was being handled before the actual negotiations began.

In a situation like this, any error or area left unattended had the ability to derail the entire negotiation process and it seemed that those involved had great knowledge of this. From what can be seen in the manner they were tackling all the many problems at hand indicated that there was a firm grasp and clear path was mapped out. “The National Peace Accord” signed by twenty three political organisations were the last pre negotiations before C.O.D.E.S.A. officially began.¹⁷ “All our previous bilateral discussions had been laying the groundwork for these talks”¹⁸ The extensive preparation prior to C.O.D.E.S.A. may well have held the key to its eventual success.

The Convention for a Democratic South Africa

C.O.D.E.S.A. under the guidance of the judges Michael Corbett, Petrus Shabot and Ismail Mohamed began with a plenary session on the 20th of December 1991.¹⁹ Described by Nelson Mandela as an “Historic Occasion with an “optimism that could not be dampened,”²⁰ showed the positive attitudes and true looking towards the future with great expectations. The hard work of all involved before C.O.D.E.S.A. began gave C.O.D.E.S.A. this springboard of real opportunity, the pre - negotiations enabled the negotiations to begin with the sense that success was possible.

¹⁶ Ibid. Pge. 280.

¹⁷ Ibid. Pge. 27.

¹⁸ Mandela, N, R. Nelson Mandela Long Walk To Freedom. Macdonald, Purnell, (PTY) LTD. 1994. Pge. 586.

¹⁹ “Celebrating Freedom and Democracy The C.O.D.E.S.A. Negotiations” <http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governance-projects/constitution/codesa.htm> Date Retrieved: 07/10/2009..

²⁰ Mandela, N, R. Op. Cit. Pge. 586.

Groups were created that dealt with specific issues and worked constantly for over a month focusing on the specific issues that were at hand. Issues such as government, the constitution and the homelands were dealt with.²¹ Any successful diplomatic and negotiation process needs exactly this in order to be successful. Specific areas of concern need to be addressed separately, as this allows for these issues not only to be adequately focused on, but stops the disruption of other issues coming into play and compromising the efficiency of the process of the discussions of the issues at hand. It is essential to break up the situation in areas that need to be addressed specifically. This also allows a careful examination of what issues are the most problematical.

Nineteen groups were represented at C.O.D.E.S.A., which covered all concerned parties. The presence of democratic parties and left wing parties were all in attendance, which highlighted the ability and potential of the groups being able to co-exist considering the diversity in political views. This gathering perhaps had a strong indication that tolerance was superceding prejudice. The presence of all these parties ensured that nobody was left out, which is vital for success to take place, as all being present, in theory, all will be considered and this is the only fair way to do things. This also prevents comebacks and problems being presented at a later stage by parties that may have been left out.

A problem came about when a by – election was held by the Nationalist Party which was won by the Conservatives who opposed the negotiations with the A.N.C. de Klerk had to do something and he made a bold move in an “all in” manner announcing that a referendum would take place on the 17th of March. With the referendum, in which all white citizens part took in the “yes or no” vote for the continuation of the reforms. “The referendum asked a plain and direct question do you support the continuation of the reform process which the state president began on the 2nd of February 1990, which is aimed at a new constitution through negotiation.”²² The results saw an overwhelming majority of the white population opting for reforms to take place.²³ This indicated that a major and integral theme in

²¹ Ibid. www.sahistory.org.za

²² Mandela, N, R. *Op. Cit.* Pge. 590.

²³ *Loc. Cit.*

successful negotiations which is the willingness of those involved could be seen; already by the leaders of parties, but now could clearly be seen by the general public. Whilst the A.N.C. opposed the referendum as it did not include black votes, it was given that the black population would want change as they were the ones suffering, but it could now be seen that the white population in South Africa wanted change as well.

However, with such a complex situation and so many sensitivities, there were bound to be problems and there were. The issue of Kwazulu Natal saw the absence of Mangosuthu Buthelezi at the negotiations. He withdrew, as C.O.D.E.S.A. did not include representation from the Kwazulu Natal government.²⁴ There were boycotts from both the left wing, namely the P.A.C. and A.Z.A.P.O. who believed the process would not be fair or diplomatic, and from the right wing parties of the A.W.B. and the Conservative party. The left wing groups who did not trust the white parties or the process, and the right wing groups who did not want to negotiate with any black party or perhaps did not want change at all, posed a big threat.

There will always be parties and individuals that will remain extreme and opt not to move forward but to the eternal credit of those involved and C.O.D.E.S.A. those parties were prevented from destroying the process by the parties and those who wanted to move forward, and did so²⁵ Problems such as these will always be incurred, but it is the manner in which these situations are dealt with that is the difference between success and failure in the negotiation process.

de Klerk and Mandela's opening statements held very similar sentiment that of true transformation. Mandela opened with the words: "Today will mark the commencement of the transitions from apartheid to democracy."²⁶ de Klerk said: "I believe that we are on the threshold of a new South Africa, firmly based on the foundations of fairness and justice."²⁷ Both the opening statements indicated the intention to transform from the old oppressive unjust Apartheid South Africa into a

²⁴ Meer, F. *Op. Cit.* Pge 54.

²⁵ *Ibid.* Pge. 55.

²⁶ *Ibid.* Pge. 56.

²⁷ *Loc. Cit.*

democracy that was free and fair. Both leaders were on the same page and made it very clear what the intended outcomes needed to be.

de Klerk warned, that “schools and pupils should not be used for political purposes” He “exhorted against militant action and inveighed against mass action that exceeds the bounds of the normal democratic process.” These ideas are extremely important in a fledgling democracy as it is extremely easy for a country in transition to become entangled in corruption and “dirty politics.” He made aware the importance of the youth, and how they should not be used as pawns, and that a democracy did not mean that a free for all scenario could take place whenever there was a problem. He also spoke of the reality of existence of a variety of peoples, and emphasised the idea of uniting as South Africans.²⁸ The paramount message of the fact that South Africa was a society of many races, religions and cultures was emphasised and that in order to live in a peaceful and just society all people must be accepted and catered for. The notion also emerged of “Nation building” that all people in South Africa regardless of colour, sex or race are under the same umbrella of being South African; A highly positive message sent out that surely contributed to inspire the unity that can be seen today.

“The A.N.C. expressed a willingness to negotiate and whilst insisting on a majority rule, still remained committed to the 1955 Freedom Charter” that promised equal rights for all. The country would be enriched by everyone having their religious, cultural, language and schooling rights²⁹ the same ideologies were presented by the A.N.C. that of a South Africa that would cater for everyone and allow everyone to have their own identities as well as a South African identity. The messages delivered by the A.N.C. and the N.P. were in tandem and provided the platform on which a society could be built freely and fairly. “The South African Tragedy is that South Africa is a country that does not have a people it has race groups”³⁰ and this was something that needed to be changed. The issues were put out in the open to be dealt with, there was no holding back, the sensitive perceptions were addressed and taken

²⁸ Manzo, K. *Domination Resistance And Social Change In South Africa*. Prager Publishers, Westport, 1992. Pges. 240 – 241.

²⁹ Ibid. Pge. 237

³⁰ Ibid. Pge. 69.

care of and that is one of the reasons the process was a success. The harboured feelings were exposed and the truths, no matter how ugly they were, they needed to be shown. This was the only way to deal with them and it worked very well. “In South Africa ethnicity has been used as a divisive force leading to suspicion, mistrust and cynicism.”³¹ The consensus between the parties was that this ideology needed to be eliminated. Whites, Blacks, Indians and Coloureds all had stereotypes of one another that needed to be proved false and C.O.D.E.S.A. presented that opportunity.

During “C.O.D.E.S.A. One”: The title given to the negotiation timeframe that took place from 20th of December 1991, until the interruption period. Many sensitive issues were raised issues such as the position and plans of the armed wing of the A.N.C.³² and at times the negotiations got extremely heated, especially when the topics of armed struggle and use of violence against protesters were raised.³³ These issues needed to be raised in order to successfully move forward. Ultimately the calm manner in which they were addressed went a long way for the agreements to be reached. As in any negotiation there will be difficult matters to overcome. In C.O.D.E.S.A. these included the governance system, minority rights, the homelands and the prosecution of political “criminals”

Mandela favoured an Interim Government that would oversee the elections and the eventual outcome of a Constituent Assembly that that would lead to the new non - racial,³⁴ non - sexist democracy.³⁵ It was felt that the old government should not oversee the new elections and that the interim government should be put in place by C.O.D.E.S.A. to do so. This seemed both logical and fair.

De Klerk agreed to this :“We are to begin negotiating immediately on amending the constitution of the Republic to make an interim power sharing model on a democratic

³¹ Loc. Cit.

³² Ngculu, J. *The role of Umkhonto we Sizwe in the creation of a democratic civil-military relations tradition* In “Ourselves To Know. Pge. 247. Retrieved Online: <http://www.iss.co.za/pubs/Books/OurselvesToKnow/Ngculu2.pdf> Date Retrieved 16/11/2009.

³³ Meer, F. *Op cit.* Pges. 59 – 61.

³⁴ STATEMENT AT THE PLENARY AT THE 48TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON THE AGENDA ITEM 38: ELIMINATION OF APARTHEID AND ESTABLISHMENT OF A UNITED, DEMOCRATIC AND NON-RACIAL SOUTH AFRICA 13 DECEMBER 1993. Retrieved Online From: <http://www.anc.org.za/un/gm-93-94d.html> Date Retrieved: 18/11/2009.

³⁵ Meer, F. *Op.Cit.* Pge. 67.

basis”³⁶ Both leaders were in agreement that a power sharing deal would be arranged and both were willing to adapt to each others needs. The fact of the matter is that what was going to happen was that minority rule of the previous white regime would eventually be replaced majority rule. This was dealt with by putting in place the interim government to help make the transition smoother and not such a drastic sudden switch. De Klerk warned that majority rule did have its problems, and the points were emphasised that whilst democracy did entail a majority rule it also meant that minorities would be treated fairly and have meaningful participation.³⁷

The talks were affirming that a true democracy was going to be formed, not just a system in which the majority ruled with an iron fist. It had to be made clear that once the minority relinquished its power it would not simply be cast aside, not allowed to make their opinions heard or even be attacked which in reality was a possibility “At the heart of democracy is there a quest that in general terms, the majority viewpoint must prevail. On the other hand, parties that lose the elections, should have a guaranteed right to oppose the majority.”³⁸ The minority in South Africa unlike most minorities in other regions were affluent and educated, and it was made clear that minority rights were not going to be minority privileges.³⁹ The constant emphasis that all would be treated equally was made known.

It was given that the majority would most likely elect for the A.N.C. to rule, but it was made clear that minorities would still have a “dynamic role to play.”⁴⁰ It seemed that the ideas about the democracy that was wanted in South Africa was the same amongst all parties. The points that a majority rule did not entitle the majority to abuse its power and that the minority would be viewed, if voted out as credible opposition, not just a political minority⁴¹ indicating that a free challengeable system was being put in

³⁶ Loc. Cit.

³⁷ Ibid. Pges. 70 – 71.

³⁸ Ibid. Pge. 72.

³⁹ Ibid. Pge. 71.

⁴⁰ Ibid. Pge.72.

⁴¹ Ibid. Pge. 70.

place. The A.N.C. and the N.P. agreed on these definitions of democracy and the interim government and the process of change was furthered.

The issue of the homelands which had been a policy that had divided the country into separate groups and areas such as Ciskei, Transkei, Venda and Bophuthatswana, to segregate the country was discussed with plans to re-unite the regions. The leaders who felt the homelands were a creation of the apartheid state wanted to be incorporated back into South Africa. All members of the country wanted to be a part of the new constitution.⁴² All that were previously disconnected with South Africa due to apartheid law now had the opportunity to rejoin and unite with South Africa. All the processes happening were a complete reversal of the apartheid regime.

Like with mostly all negotiating scenarios the situation becomes extremely difficult and heavily involved with a multitude of issues, which often leads the diplomacy and negotiation process to reach a point where a pause and a re – evaluation is needed. The same happened with C.O.D.E.S.A. Many aspects were addressed very successfully and C.O.D.E.S.A. One, which was noted earlier was beginning of the process of change. “After a four month interruption the multiparty conference held its second plenary session at the World Trade Centre known as C.O.D.E.S.A Two”.⁴³

C.O.D.E.S.A. Two ran into difficulties very quickly, and one of the main problems was that the government was very hesitant to submit to majority rule.⁴⁴ The problems of the Nationalists wanting a very high percentage of votes to approve a constitution and the ideas that the interim constitution would be made by both parties would be permanent.⁴⁵ These demands made by the government showed that there were some reservations on what was taking place and they were trying to prevent all power being taken away from them, by trying to implement these policies. Mandela described the hurdles as “all difficult issues but not insoluble ones”.⁴⁶ Again the determination and persistence to forge forward was one of the main attributes that contributed to the

⁴² Ibid. Pges. 75. – 76.

⁴³ Mandela. N.R. Op. Cit Pge. 593.

⁴⁴ Ibid. Pge. 595.

⁴⁵ Loc. Cit.

⁴⁶ Loc. Cit.

success of the C.O.D.E.S.A. process. Unfortunately the negotiations stalled and what might be described as the most testing times of the process began with “rolling mass action”⁴⁷ which intended to show that “The people of South Africa were not prepared to wait forever for their freedom.”⁴⁸ Strikes, demonstrations and boycotts were going to take place.⁴⁹ The events that followed almost completely destroyed all the work that had already been done.

“On the night of 17th June 1992 heavily armed forces killed 46 people,” known as the massacre of Boipatong. “The Inkahta members were responsible but the government and police force did nothing to stop the violence.”⁵⁰ This perhaps indicated that the government by its silence and non – action were secret accomplices to the atrocities. It perhaps may have even suited some of the nationalists as the A.N.C. were the ones being attacked. This once again raised all the issues of mistrust and ill – feelings. The negotiations were suspended and serious thought as to why the A.N.C. should still negotiate were discussed. Signs were held up by angry protesters, “Mandela give us guns, and victory through battle not talk.” The A.N.C. saw the Government as the ones stalling the negotiations in the first place and now possibly being responsible for attacking the A.N.C.

The process was in serious danger of failing and turning into a full scale civil war. Many of the people wanted to resort back to the armed struggle, and had very little faith left in the negotiation process. The demonstrations in Bisho also created encounters between protesters and police but the situation was placed under control by the fast thinking of Dr. Antonie Geldenhuys the chairman of the National Peace Accord and National Party Foreign minister Pik Botha by allowing the protests to continue and avoiding another disaster like Boipatong⁵¹ This is where the point came when the ability, perseverance and uncomprehensible character came into play by the individuals involved. Those who in the face of persisting adversity refused to give up

⁴⁷ Loc. Cit.

⁴⁸ Loc. Cit.

⁴⁹ Loc. Cit.

⁵⁰ Mandela, N, R. Op. Cit. Pge. 595.

⁵¹ Meer, F. Op. Cit. Pge. 105.

what was trying to be achieved and despite the constant and very possible threat of violence and failure continued their efforts to bring about a peaceful change.

“The Efforts Of The Willing”

Whilst careful diplomatic skill and highly developed techniques are needed in order to successfully resolve conflicts especially with the high sensitivities involved, the extraordinary ability of specific individuals are possibly the only way in which a highly potentially explosive situation can be disarmed. After everything that had taken place Mandela said: “I will not turn my back on negotiations”⁵² Mandela had the vision to transform South Africa into a democracy through peaceful talks and he continued on this path. Mandela’s superb ability to address the nation maintained order amongst those who were ready to act violently.

de Klerk also tried to show his good intentions and willingness to continue peacefully as he tried to visit Boipatong and re – emphasised his promise “to end apartheid and steer South Africa on a new road”⁵³ Both Mandela and de Klerk believed at this point that they kept their ends of the deal, but there was some skepticism of one for the other. International support was called for, In mid July, C.O.D.E.S.A. effectively convened at the United Nations with more international pressure. Individuals like Cyrus Vance special U.N. envoy encouraged negotiations to continue.

Whilst the terrible events of Bisho and Boipatong had the potential to derail the entire process, Mandela reiterated the old proverb “the darkest hour is before dawn” and how true this statement turned out to be. The violence of Boipatong and Bisho had the destructive ability to completely end the negotiating process. However, in complete contrast to this, these events may have inadvertently pushed the process in the right direction. The violence and disruption that was caused perhaps reminded the people of what they were trying to prevent. It was too similar to the “old days” which they were trying to be moved away from. Perhaps these events acted as painful reminders of what happened and could continue to happen if the negotiations were not

⁵² Mandela, N, R. *Op. Cit.* Pge. 596.

⁵³ Meer, F. *Op. Cit.* Pge. 102.

continued. It might well have been the case as soon after these events with the international assistance and the positivity of those involved Mandela met De Klerk “to try and find common ground”⁵⁴ The negotiations were put back on track. At the official summit on the 26th of September, Mandela signed the “Record Of Understanding”⁵⁵

Bisho and Boipateng were huge stumbling blocks, but they did not prevent the process from continuing. There was a perseverance shown by those involved that they were determined to achieve success. This determination and persistence under the most testing of times is vital if negotiations are to achieve what they initially set out to accomplish. Problems will always arise but it is the ability of those involved to overcome the problems and adapt to each others wants and needs that contributes so heavily to the success of the diplomatic processes. More problems were incurred when the assassination of Chris Hani, which was a blatant attempt to derail the negotiation process took place in April, but again thankfully it did not stop the peaceful transition.

Nelson Mandela went on S.A.B.C. T.V. and addressed the nation. He said that the process of peace and negotiations could not be halted “I am reaching to every single South African black and white from the very depths of my being”⁵⁶ and asked the nation instead of acting violently to one mans attempts to cause violence, to honour Chris Hani “by remaining a disciplined force for peace”⁵⁷ It was also an Afrikaans woman who courageously identified the man who shot Hani. It seemed that the nation was coming together and looking out not only for their own groups but for South Africans and South Africa as a whole. Just like the massacres it seemed that South African’s had had enough of violence and chose to not act in a manner of more violence, but rather use these atrocities to move further towards peace. It began to become clear that some groups were willing to rather see the country in civil war

⁵⁴ Mandela, N, R. *Op. Cit.* Pge. 597.

⁵⁵ *Loc. Cit.*

⁵⁶ Mandela, N.R. *Op. Cit.* Pge. 600

⁵⁷ *Loc. Cit.*

rather than let the majority rule. The majority however of both Blacks and Whites refused to let this happen.

Tony Leon described the assassination as a major shift in the A.N.C.'s favour "In truth the Hani assassination was a tipping point, and now beyond doubt or argument power tipped in the direction of the A.N.C."⁵⁸ the anger that was felt by the supporters of Hani and the violence that could have ensued which was only prevented by Nelson Mandela's appeals strongly indicated that Nelson Mandela had the influence and the power to lead the nation and he had the support of the people.⁵⁹

Acts that were meant to push South Africans further apart in fact brought them closer together. For the first time it was being viewed that events such as this were not against specific groups or races but against South Africans as a whole. The Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging taking control of the World Trade Centre in Kempton Park, was another obstacle. These acts indicated that there will always be parties that will be unsatisfied and do everything in their power to disrupt a peaceful outcome. The challenge is left to the leaders to overcome these problems and not let these parties destroy the negotiation process which is often easier said than done. However with Nelson Mandela's incredible ability to speak to a nation, and the incredible way in which the nation chose to deal with these incidents they did not achieve what those wishing to stop the transition wanted them to.

Often it takes individual personalities to pull negotiations out of tricky situations and the efforts of Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer did exactly this.⁶⁰ This relationship was like a microcosm of the possibilities that could take place between the white and non white communities. The developing trend of representatives, members and leaders of opposition parties forming relationships could clearly be seen. Great ideas from progressive thinkers were key to the success such as Joe Slovos "Sunset Clause" which ultimately had a coalition government in place, showed the incredible possibility that two sides could work together at the highest level. Individuals of high character and substance that provide examples to the people they lead. Individuals

⁵⁸ Leon, T. *On The Contrary*. Jonathan Ball Publishers, Johannesburg and Cape Town. 2008 Pge. 218.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.* pge. 217.

⁶⁰ "The New South Africa." Pge.3. http://capetown.at/heritage/history/newSA_agree.htm Date retrieved: 11/10/2009.

that show the ultimate willingness through their efforts are owed a huge gratitude and credit for the part they played in keeping the process on its path.

Power sharing was agreed upon provided minority parties did not have a veto. Secret bilateral talks were held between the A.N.C. and the government. These talks were paramount and continued with the ideas established in the record of understanding. The five year interim unity government was agreed upon and together with structure of cabinet representations. After five years a unity government would become the majority elected government. The light at the end of the tunnel could well and truly be seen and the planning for the first free and fair elections in South Africa were beginning to be planned.⁶¹ Mandela's extraordinary presence and ability to address his people and prevent them from continuing in a violent struggle was momentous.

De Klerk's continued efforts and goodwill gave an assurance to his people that what was taking place was necessary and for the best. Cyril Ramaphosa and Roelf Meyer's meetings contributed heavily to rescuing the negotiations. Individuals that were willing in their own capacity even under the circumstances to carry on negotiating also had the presence to make a nation follow suit. Cyril Ramaphosa said: "We emerge from this with a deep sense of satisfaction that a torch of hope has been lit for our country."⁶² The use of words by the leaders involved all seemed to deliver the same messages; that of hope for the future, and their words all contained the same phrases like our country our nation one South Africa. These are powerful factors that set the tone and instilled the sense of possibility into the nation. Carefully chosen words by these individuals that had great effects.

The African National Congress led by Nelson Mandela and the National Party led by F.W. de Klerk leading South Africa perhaps had the ability to reveal to the nation the possibility of unification and peaceful co-existence was possible. C.O.D.E.S.A. did hit speed bumps but it seemed that those involved genuinely believed in what can be seen today was possible and were going to continue the process no matter what. These attitudes seemed to have had a ripple effect over the entire nation which also began to believe in what their leaders did. However whilst it could be said that

⁶¹ Mandela, N, R. *Op. Cit.* Pge. 598.

⁶² Meer, F. *Op. Cit.* Pge. 125.

C.O.D.E.S.A did fall short in some aspects, it gave rise to the process that ultimately became the “Multi Party Negotiating Forum” which saw those who initially were not present at C.O.D.E.S.A. become involved.⁶³

While Mangosuthu Buthelezi was still reluctant to unite with the process, Nelson Mandela was able to, via a special status agreement for Kwazulu Natal to persuade Buthelezi, and he too joined the negotiations. This shows that whilst all were having to unify simultaneously and put a vast array of differences aside, the leaders were able to cater for and satisfy the individuals and their specific wants and needs, which was a massively difficult task, but one that was done with much pluck and accord. Adaptation and communication were present that were paramount to success.

The very essence of diplomacy is getting a message across and it seemed that there was no better man to deliver a message than Nelson Mandela “He was to prove the most powerful and important messenger and medium on South Africa’s stage”⁶⁴ de Klerk in his choice of words that he delivered were too extremely important he knew the way in which the wind was blowing and the messages that Mandela and De Klerk delivered were possibly the foundations of the entire process.

Outside assistance, which is often necessary in complicated diplomacy and negotiations was given by U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and former British Foreign Minister Lord Carrington. Carrington and Kissinger arrived in South Africa to assist in getting Buthelezi to join the elections, although Carrington and Kissinger left very quickly after they arrived, They left behind a Kenyan member of their team Washington Okumu. Okumu delivered the message to Buthelezi that informed him that the situation he was in was completely unbeneficial for him and The Inkatha Freedom Party. “Okumu never significantly changed the deal offered to Buthelezi but provided a face saving exit from the corner that the I.F.P. had unpainted itself”⁶⁵

“The Record Of Understanding” which broke the stalemate of C.O.D.E.S.A. Two which dealt with the constitutional assembly and an interim government, was also put

⁶³ “The History Of The Constitution.” <http://www.constitutionalcourt.org.za/text/constitution/history.html>

⁶⁴ Leon, T. *Op. Cit.* Pge. 183

⁶⁵ Bouckaert, P. “South Africa: The Negotiated Transition from Apartheid to Non - racial Democracy” Pge. 252. <http://www.wilsoncenter.org/subsites/ccpdc/pubs/words/9.pdf>

firmly in place. Bilateral agreements were reached between the A.N.C. and the N.P. which were the two main actors involved in the new negotiations.⁶⁶ “The government agreed to accept a single, constitutionally elected assembly.”⁶⁷ These decisions that were made by the N.P. and the A.N.C. were made in a stoic and swift manner. This almost forced the other parties to take what was going on seriously and comply. The two opposition powerhouses used their persistence and clout to get all involved, in line.

P.W. Botha presented a very notable idea “No outsiders but South Africans themselves, can resolve the problems facing this country”⁶⁸ This was all too true, the years and years of hostilities and the multitude of issues between the diversity of people could only be understood by the people and it needed to be dealt with by South Africans and this is what took place. Yes outside assistance was given and is necessary but the only people that could truly mend the situation were South Africans and that is exactly what happened.

“All that was left to negotiate was a date for the election of the assembly and the percentage of majorities necessary for it to reach its decisions” “We were now aligned on the basic framework that would take the country into a democratic future.”⁶⁹ On the eighteenth of November 1993 The “Interim Constitution” was ratified⁷⁰ and a Transitional Executive Council planned the first free and fair democratic elections in South Africa.

⁶⁶ <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/record.html>

⁶⁷ Mandela. N.R. *Op. Cit.* Pge. 597.

⁶⁸ Etherington, N. *Peace, Politics and Violence In The New South Africa*. Hans Zell Publishers. London, 1992.

⁶⁹ Mandela. N, R. *Op. Cit* Pge. 597.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*

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**TOPIC: Valuable Lessons from two different situations:
C.O.D.E.S.A versus Oslo, could techniques from South
Africa assist conflict resolution in Israel/Palestine**

CHAPTER 2

**“Trying To Bring Peace Between The Israeli’s And The
Palestinian’s”**

Chapter Two:

Trying To Bring Peace Between The Israelis And The Palestinians

For decades a conflict between Israelis and Palestinians has been raging, with the possibility for a peace to be achieved between the two nations seeming unattainable or even impossible. With numerous wars fought, multitudes of upheavals and thousands of lives lost, the hatred that has ensued has been relentless. The results are actions by the Israelis placing roadblocks and restrictions on the Palestinians to counter measure the suicide bombings that are carried out by extremist Muslims. The difficulties of territory, religion, culture and history are all thrown into the mix that make this conflict extremely difficult to try and resolve.

The Oslo Accords

The Oslo Accords, officially called the “Declaration of Principles On Interim Self Government Arrangements” or “The Declaration Of Principles” was intended to become the framework for negotiations and were the result of the first “face to face” meetings between the Israeli Government and The representatives of the Palestinian people, The Palestinian Liberation Organisation.⁷¹ It was believed that direct talks between Israel and the P.L.O. were a prerequisite for peace.⁷² Considering the two parties were effectively at war, they both had to put many differences aside to even considering having these talks. “The long tortuous history of the Arab - Israeli and Palestinian - Israeli conflicts has witnessed numerous tragic episodes, but rarely a moment as hopeful as the handshake between the leaders of the State of Israel and The Palestinian Liberation Organisation on September 13th, 1993.”⁷³ On the White house Lawns, while many emotions were said to be felt that day, “hope was the most powerful.”⁷⁴ There was for the first time, possibly in the history of the conflict that a real belief was felt that this time negotiations and diplomacy could work to achieve peace. Before Yitzhak Rabin was elected as Prime Minister, or any handshakes took place in Washington, secret meetings took place between a Norwegian sociologist

⁷¹ Ami Isseroff, The Oslo Declaration Of Principles Retrieved Online at: <http://www.mideastweb.org/meoslodop.htm> 07/10/2009

⁷² Maovsky, D. Making Peace With the P.L.O. The Rabin Government’s Road To The Oslo Accord Published In Cooperation With The Washington Institute For Near East Policy. Westview Press. A Division Harper Collins Publishers United States Of America. 1996. Pge. 13

⁷³ Ibid. pge. 1

⁷⁴ Ibid. Pge. 1.

Terje Larsen who was highly concerned with the Palestinian situation and Yossi Beilin, a Labour Party representative, who to had a constant agenda to try and initiate talks.⁷⁵ At the same time Yair Hirschfeld had met with Ahmed Qurei a representative of the P.L.O. As it was agreed, in order for any chance of peace talks needed to take place between the P.L.O. and Israel.

At this time it was against Israeli law to engage with the P.L.O. so it was arranged with the help of Yair Hirschfeld that a “back channel” be set up to speak to Faisal Husseini, who was regarded as a “leading representative” of the P.L.O. in the occupied territories.⁷⁶ Unbeknown to the Norwegian contingent, Beilin and Husseini had already been meeting and a relationship between the two was in existence.⁷⁷ Once Yossi Beilin, who did not yet know that Hirschfeld and Qurei had already met, gave the go ahead for a meeting. “The Oslo Channel was born” In January 1993. ⁷⁸

A channel of communication began to take shape with Beilin briefing Peres who in turn briefed Rabin.⁷⁹ The main players were getting involved and the negotiations were becoming a reality. During the first round of talks, three main ideas were agreed upon. Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip, “economic co-operation between Israelis and Palestinians” and an International Marshall Plan for a Palestinian entity in Gaza.⁸⁰ These seemed like the most logical places to start but it can not helped being felt that simultaneously there wanted to be a level of separation, and a unity through co-operation. Perhaps the lines became blurred. To what extent were the Israeli’s and the Palestinian’s going to co-operate and did Israeli and Palestinian people want this type of relationship.

The second round of talks produced a six page document that detailed Israel’s withdrawal from Gaza, negotiation that would take place on a permanent status of Jerusalem and Palestinian voting rights in East Jerusalem, and the idea of self rule in

⁷⁵Ross, D The Missing Peace Farrar, Straus And Giroux. New York 2004. Pge. 101.

⁷⁶ Maovsky, D. Op.Cit. Pge. 13.

⁷⁷ Ross,D Op.Cit. Pge.101.

⁷⁸ Loc. Cit.

⁷⁹ Ibid. Pge 102.

⁸⁰ Loc. Cit

this region.⁸¹ From this it can be seen how incredibly difficult the process was. Jerusalem alone poses such massive problems due to its cultural and religious significance to so many parties, that it in itself needs its own diplomacy and negotiation process. However at this stage it seemed that the parties were finally if anything willing to begin negotiating on these issues that had for so long been disputed, and refused to be engaged with.

There was plenty of the proverbial “testing of the waters” in the months that followed and each side was trying to establish exactly what they could demand at this stage. An Interim period that would be setup, Rabin believed would give a chance for the two sides to try out the system that could lead to an eventual conflict resolution. He believed the two sides “would learn to live together.”⁸² What is so important in these situations is the belief and willingness of leaders and Rabin clearly had that, the problem may have been that the Israelis and Palestinians citizens did not share in that belief or possibly want to, and the distinct possibility that neither did the P.L.O. Whilst it is essential to have leaders that opt to take the routes towards peace, it has to be on both sides and at this stage it was not entirely convincing from the lack of messages by the P.L.O. that that was what was truly wanted.

The accords were arranged to deal with all current and future negotiations seemingly of all the problems between the Israelis and the Palestinians. From this alone it may possibly be noted that the chance of failure was possible. Not only that this may have been too ambitious as there were so many problems, but it also gave a sense of an “open ended feeling” a sense that there would always be a need to negotiate does not seem like the ideal way to end a conflict through negotiations but rather a way of saying that there may always be conflict and this will be the platform used to discuss it. Perhaps the lack of a final goal might have been a problem, and off course at this stage each side had not established what they had wanted or could have gained, but some form of ultimate ideal may have helped.

A Declaration of Principles would imply that there existed some level of trust between the two parties but one feels that this level of trust certainly did not exist. The two

⁸¹ Loc. Cit

⁸² Loc. Cit.

parties had been in conflict for years and there needed to be more actions from each side showing that they were ready to change. The multitude of complexities and issues needed a much more pragmatic approach. The two nations had fought numerous devastating wars, surely these issues needed to be discussed first and taken into consideration. At the very least a process that took place at a much slower pace was needed.

The Accords aimed to be a framework for all negotiations but what was needed were negotiations that especially at this stage, (when the two parties had not ever met face to face), that would allow them to meet and gain some level of trust and form some sort of a relationship. The Accords were signed in Oslo Norway on the twentieth of August 1993⁸³ and then officially at a public ceremony in Washington. Whilst the signing marked an intention to work together on the issues at hand one strongly feels at this stage the multitude of complexities should not have been laid out. Rather, meetings should have been held on some fundamental issues such as the options of a one or two state solution, then, once major concerns such as that were dealt with adequately what should have followed were issues such as governance and territories.

The Details Of The Accords

The Accords were divided into annexes specifically dealing with Palestinian elections, withdrawal of Israeli troops and joint plans for Israeli and Palestinian security cooperation.⁸⁴ Perhaps these plans may have been slightly too demanding on such a sensitive situation, and it is felt the focus needed to be primarily more directed at finalising statehood and issues of clearly defined borders, then a move towards the cooperation in these areas. The issue of a one or two state solution was most likely the place from which to begin, and once this had been decided, a sense of security for both parties could have been achieved, then moving towards co-operation between the countries. Before the Palestinians are given an official homeland it seems doubtful that they will be willing to co – operate. Perhaps at this stage a promise of a Palestinian homeland should have been established.

⁸³ <http://www.answers.com/topic/oslo-accords>

⁸⁴ Maovsky, D. *Op.Cit.* Pge. 30.

Ideas such as economic cooperation and regional development⁸⁵ these were issues outlined in what became known as the “Sarpsborg 3” the document “contained fifteen articles”⁸⁶ that dealt with issues in the fields of cooperation regarding water, electricity, energy, finance and labour relations were being addressed, these are vital aspects, but again before these details were discussed a more solid plan for statehood perhaps should have been established. Too much was being put on the table too soon, in a sense that these concerns are usually dealt with by states that have already been formed and are relatively structured. At this point there was no Palestinian state, nor a complete recognition of an Israeli state. It seems like a house was trying to be built on very unstable foundations. Diplomacy and negotiations are a finely balanced art and with the stakes so high it becomes even more difficult, so step by step plans need to be much more concise.

The “interim period of Palestinian self rule, which the ground rules permitted either side to retract an offer at any point.”⁸⁷ This may have taken off some of the pressure in such a delicate situation as nothing was permanent as it allowed both sides to get a feel and to address issues that had never been addressed before. Perhaps this was the only way to actually get both parties to agree, if there was a so called “escape clause.” On “May 13th Rabin and Peres met to discuss upgrading the Oslo talks.”⁸⁸ It would seem at this point that the leaders were really pushing for the talks to continue and have a successful outcome. Israel wanted higher participation in the talks and it is said that this was a “turning point” when the talks become official negotiations between Israelis and Palestinians. It also indicated that now the Israeli’s were officially talking to the P.L.O. It gave the Palestinians official representation and the entire process was completely legitimised.⁸⁹ This was a major happening in the region and now that there were officially two parties negotiating a sense of belief that a peace could be achieved.

⁸⁵ <http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Peace/dop.html>

⁸⁶ Maovsky, D. *Op.Cit.* Pge. 31

⁸⁷ *Loc. Cit*

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* Pge 45.

⁸⁹ *Loc. Cit.*

There were still however feelings amongst Palestinian's that whilst having no official country they did not really have a "leg to stand on" or conduct a fair negotiation. "Having nothing to give up the Palestinian's had nothing to negotiate."⁹⁰ Israel was an established modern state, the Palestinians a dispersed, displaced, disinherited community with no territory of its own.⁹¹ There has always been a feeling of complete injustice amongst the Palestinians, feeling completely dominated by their neighbours, which has not only led to a hatred of Israel, but also a complete lack of trust that is essential to build a relationship on which a peaceful outcome via negotiations can be achieved. These kinds of feelings needed to be addressed. The next procedure may have gone a long way in accomplishing this, and helping to eradicate some of these feelings and assist in successful conflict resolution.

There would be a transfer of authority from the Israel Defence Forces to the authorised Palestinians. The presence of Israeli military was a huge issue for the Palestinians. The presence was there to protect Israelis but at the same time innocent Palestinians were being as viewed as suspicious because of guilty parties. The relationship that consisted of mistrust and skepticism is a defining feature of the of the dynamics between the groups and as such compromised the situation. As detailed in "Sarpsborg" "Israel agreed to withdraw from Gaza within two years, at which point a "trusteeship" of some sort would be established to govern the territory."⁹² The agreements on "groundbreaking" subjects and discussion points were being introduced; for the first time negotiations over the situation of Jerusalem⁹³ was also presented and the concerns of settlements sovereignty⁹⁴ and borders were all being discussed.⁹⁵

⁹⁰ Said, E.W. *From Oslo To Iraq And The Roadmap* Bloomsbury Publishing Plc. London. 2004. Pge. 7.

⁹¹ *Ibid.* Pge. 6.

⁹² Maovsky, D. *Op.Cit.* Pge. 31

⁹³ Dr. Hadi, M.A. "Jeruslaem Issues And The Final Status Negotiation" Retrieved Online: www.passia.org/about_us/MahdiPapers/8-Jerusalem.doc Date Retrieved: 07/10/2009.

⁹⁴ Arnon.A, Weinblatt.J. "Sovereignty And Economic Development: The Case Of Israel And Palestine," *The Economic Journal* 111 June, 2001. Blackwell Publishers.

⁹⁵ Maovsky, D. *Op. Cit.* Pge. 32.

New elements began to emerge on the “Declaration Of Principles” on a session held on June 25th – 27th. Such as plans concerning education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism were also on the agenda.⁹⁶ These procedures are vital if an achievement such as this is going to be reached but surely the procedures were simply just the wrong way around. Permanent status agreement perhaps should have been reached first, as this may have shown ultimate trust and allowed all the other areas to possibly flourish, once a more concrete level of trust had been established.

A major area of concern was that of security, after so much violence has taken place so it is understandable how weary the parties were. A major issue of consideration and contestation throughout the process was the issue of security. Israel was very reluctant to relinquish its control over security in the Palestinian entity even though Gaza was to be withdrawn from. There were many other areas that the Israeli Defence Force still had control over. The Palestinians viewed a complete withdrawal as a willingness from the Israeli side to eventually completely give them a complete self controlled territory. For Israel, complete withdrawal meant that those living in settlements would have no protection from potentially hostile neighbours.⁹⁷ It also posed problems, as, if there was no military presence, terrorist organisations would have free reign over these highly vulnerable areas.

The Accords detailed the creation of a Palestinian National Authority, one that would have control of its territory and people and the withdrawal of the Israeli Defence Force from parts of the Gaza Strip and the West Bank.⁹⁸ This alone was a massive and complex task, but it was successfully achieved and indicated that substantial moves were being made in the right direction. The Oslo Accords stated that Israel would recognise the P.L.O. as the official representation of the Palestinian people and Israel would be recognised by the P.L.O.⁹⁹ A major problem here was that whilst the more

⁹⁶ Ibid. Pge. 55.

⁹⁷ Loc. Cit

⁹⁸ Maovsky, D. Making Peace With the P.L.O. The Rabin Government’s Road To The Oslo Accord Published In Cooperation With The Washington Institute For Near East Policy. Westview Press. A Division Harper Collins Publishers United States Of America. 1996. Pge. 13

⁹⁹ http://www.time.com/time/specials/2007/article/0,28804,1644149_1644147_1644129,00.html 2009

moderate factions on the Palestinian side were prepared to recognise Israel and the same principles on the Israeli side, the massive issue of extremism and those who believed Israel had no right to exist and from the Israeli side, those that believed there was no place for a Palestine in the land of Eretz Israel.

The Accords were signed after months of secret negotiations.¹⁰⁰ This would seem to have presented the possibility that the media and general public would not become too involved and jeopardise the process. However it seems that once the plans were revealed the many factions and splits within the two parties had too many strong opposing views which may have compromised the situation. There was much dissatisfaction shown from both sides, but this could have been expected, for the time being there was large amounts of positive support for what was taking place. A five year interim period, during which a permanent peace settlement was to be negotiated began, and the “Declaration of principles” was enforced after two months.

Israel agreed to withdraw its military force from Gaza and Jericho, but this excluded the settlements. Whilst these were moves in the right direction and showed good intent, the issues of the settlements is one that is highly contested and maybe should have been addressed first. The issue of Israeli settlements to this day is viewed as a huge problem from the Palestinian side. If borders were going to be setup and two distinct regions defined, then the issues of the settlements would have had to have been settled first if the process was to succeed. While huge steps were taken and progress was made such as the P.L.O. being able to self govern and Israeli troops redeployed, failure on both sides to fulfill the commitments were seen and outbreaks of violence, which possibly stemmed from the years and years of mistrust between the two nations ultimately caused the Oslo Accords to fail. More time was needed to be spent in building trust between the leaders of each of the nations, so that the people of the nations could see that it was possible.

The issues of Jerusalem, Palestinian refugees and Israeli settlements were not addressed right away and rather set aside to be dealt with at a later stage. It seems that the sheer overwhelming amount of separate issues contributed to the failure of the Oslo Accords. Simply looking at an issue such as Jerusalem, the negotiations that

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

would need to take place to achieve a settlement is an entity on its own. The religious element which has the potential in itself to cause war needed to be dealt with on top of territorial rights, ancestral rights and cultural beliefs. Oslo's task was mammoth and lacked the necessary pre-conditioning required to attempt to sort out the problems.

The sense that there was no timeframe set to have an outcome or an ultimate goal, that would deem negotiations no longer necessary, rather a continued process for negotiations. This showed intent to continue diplomatic relations but may have given rise to the mindset that with no set date for agreements, the process would seem never ending, and that negotiations would need to take place indefinitely. With the splits in both Israeli and Arab societies, the possibility of reaching a settlement was made even more difficult.

Public support for the Accords was high. "More than sixty percent of Israelis supported the Accords initially, but this figure did dramatically decline,¹⁰¹ according to Haifa University sociologist Prof. Sammy Smooha. There is a clear majority in Israeli society today which is ready for peace. This consists of the broad centre, including a majority of Likud voters and those who support Labour. People are simply fed-up with the conflict, and at the same time there's a feeling that there is an alternative."¹⁰²

The P.L.O. accepted Oslo because it hoped to gain something after a series of drawbacks had diminished its standing as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people, support and recognition often divided amongst Palestinian's and particularly after the Gulf War amongst other parties that simply did not trust the P.L.O.¹⁰³ Palestinian support for the Oslo track was also evident and clear in the beginning.¹⁰⁴ Both Israelis and Palestinians were simply sick of the situation and wanted it changed. This indicates that for the majority of the population peace and conflict resolution was wanted, but unfortunately extremism and democracy don't

¹⁰¹ David Rudge. Jerusalem Post, <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1P1-4607350.html> 02/10/2009

¹⁰² Loc.Cit

¹⁰³ Dajani, Burhan. . "An alternative to Oslo", *Journal of Palestine Studies*. Vol. XXV, # 4. Summer 1996. PP.-19.

¹⁰⁴ Khatib, Ghassan. Interview at JMCC, December 18 1997. <http://www.multaqa.org/pdfs/CHAPTER3PalOpinion.pdf> 03/10/2009.

mix and even though the majority of both sides wanted an agreement these were minorities from both sides which did not. It only takes a minority to tip the scales in the wrong direction as violence and disruptions can easily sway majority's tolerance towards the other side.

There was feeling in the region and amongst the people that it was enough of the violence and that peace really could be achieved at this stage. Oslo presented this as it was the first face to face meetings between the two "main" parties, but what could be seen was that the other parties involved were not so willing to creating peace in the region. The ideologies of extremism are perhaps what ultimately caused the Accords to collapse. Moderate Israeli's and Palestinian's alike were extremely willing just as they are today to create a situation that caters for both equally and fairly, but fundamentalists who refuse to recognise the other, prevent this from taking place.

The constant problem which kept appearing was the official recognition of the state of Israel and Israel's recognition of the P.L.O. as the representation of the Palestinian people. Both sides seemed hesitant to make the final step of recognising each other and this is most likely to have stemmed from a mistrust that was bred over the years and years of violence and conflict. Also if the Palestinian's officially recognised Israel they could not at a later stage simply not recognise Israel.

The same applied to Israel, once they recognised the P.L.O. as a legitimate party, it would be highly problematic to go back on these moves. It must be understood that the recognition of one - another were huge steps for both parties to take. For decades they had both refused even the notion of each others existence, and had been in violent conflict with one another. On the 9th of September 1993 in Washington, Israel and the P.L.O. "officially recognised each other and said they would end their conflict."¹⁰⁵ They agreed to sign the mutual recognition accord. "It was a joint leap of faith by the two old foes, and it held out the hope for a new era of peace in the Middle East."¹⁰⁶ For the moment, all the hostilities and history of hatred and violence were

¹⁰⁵ Ethan Bronner, "Israel, PLO end long conflict Old foes officially recognize each other, pledge to share land" The Boston Globe (Boston, MA) September 10, 1993 <http://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-8244483.html> 02/10/2009.

¹⁰⁶ Loc. Cit.

put aside and incredibly the two parties acknowledged each other and each others right to exist. It seemed so viable now that a solution could be reached.

One of the most probable causes for the crisis in Israel/Palestine to be never ending is the problem of extremism. Stemming from religious beliefs, extremism dictates that there is no middle ground and no adaption. Diplomacy and negotiations can not work with a 100 percentism mentality. Another pillar of a negotiation process is an element of trust between the parties, which would imply both parties meant what they were saying and planned to follow through on what they promised. The leaders involved have to want a peaceful solution.”

Rabin knew that Arafat and the P.L.O. were the last vantage of secular Palestinian Nationalism with which Israel could deal,”¹⁰⁷ but how true was this. Whilst it may seem that Yasir Arafat was not a moderate individual, the realisation that in comparison with groups such as Islamic Jihad or H.A.M.A.S. Arafat may have been the only possible person to reason with for a peaceful settlement. Rabin saw Arafat as the person that would be most likely to take part in a negotiation, which may have been true, but questions must be asked if Yasir Arafat ever truly wanted a peaceful solution. The “last vantage of secular Palestinian Nationalism with which Israel could deal” in 1970 was quoted: “The goal of our struggle is the end of Israel, and there can be no compromise.”¹⁰⁸ In a letter to Yitzhak Rabin during the Oslo process, Arafat’s letter stipulated that the P.L.O. recognised Israel, and agreed to solve the conflict by peaceful means.¹⁰⁹ “The P.L.O. considers that the signing of the Declaration of Principles constitutes an historic event, inaugurating a new epoch of peaceful coexistence, free from violence and all other acts which endanger peace and stability.”¹¹⁰ So, had Arafat really changed his tune from such extremism to one of such tolerance, or was this just rhetoric as a means to an end. He then, in 1997 said:

¹⁰⁷ Gilbert, M. Israel: A History, William, Morrow and Company Inc. New York. 1998 . Pge. 566.

¹⁰⁸ Yasir Arafat, 1970, Washington Post March 19, 1970 <http://www.netreach.net/~zoa/newsLinks/shockers/m96.htm> 21/10/2009.

¹⁰⁹ Letter from Yasser Arafat to Chairman The Palestine Liberation Organization to Yitzhak Rabin Israeli Prime minister September 9th 1993 <http://www.mideastweb.org/osloletters.htm> 21/10/2009

¹¹⁰ Loc. Cit

“Peace for us means the destruction of Israel and nothing else.”¹¹¹ This raises some serious doubts of the true intentions of one of the parties involved in the negotiation process.

Keeping these facts in mind, it seems clear why, with so much hope and belief, that this time a solution could be reached. It may possibly all have been false hope because a solution was not wanted by Arafat. Rabin not only relayed positive messages to the Israeli people but went as far as speaking to Palestinians. “Let me say to you, the Palestinians: We are destined to live together, on the same soil in the same land.”¹¹²

It truly seemed that Rabin wanted a peaceful solution and genuinely believed in one. In order for the process to be a success, you need the support from the leaders involved and the citizens.

In the presence of the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation Yasser Arafat, Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin and U.S. President Bill Clinton the documents were signed by Mahmoud Abbas for the Palestine Liberation Organisation, foreign Minister Shimon Peres for Israel, Secretary of State Warren Christopher for the United States and foreign minister Andrei Kozyrev for Russia.¹¹³ The fact that these documents were signed by the two opposing leaders was definitely a good sign and possibly showed that a peace may have been possible. There was a massive amount of optimism and commitment from both sides but it must be noted that the sheer amount that was trying to be dealt with coupled with the troubled past, the Accords might have had a big obstacle in the way. .

The Accords caused much debate, and support from the left wing could be seen whilst opposition from the right wing was strongly voiced within Israel. The same could be seen on the Palestinian side with F.A.T.A.H. supporting the Accords and H.A.M.A.S.

¹¹¹ Yasir Arafat, interview with Oriana Fallaci, 8/25/97 http://thinkexist.com/quotation/we_plan_to_eliminate_the_state_of_israel_and/346613.html 21/10/2009.

¹¹² Yithak Rabin's Speech in Washington, September 1993. <http://www.dadalos.org/int/vorbilder/vorbilder/Rabin/zitate.htm> 21/10/2009.

¹¹³<http://www.answers.com/topic/oslo-accords>

opposing them. Again the factions can be seen and the splits within each nation making it impossible for an agreement to be reached. “After Israel and the P.L.O. agreed to a basis for Palestinian autonomy in the West Bank and Gaza, they signed a declaration of principles. H.A.M.A.S. steadfastly opposed the agreement and likened it to sacrilege.”¹¹⁴ This clearly highlights one of the biggest problems preventing peace, even though the more moderate P.L.O. was willing to agree to peace and negotiations with the Israeli’s, groups like H.A.M.A.S. were not, and never will be. Not only is there the problem of splits within the Palestinian sector which makes an agreement very difficult to achieve, the violent measures taken by those not opting for an agreement gives the process of a peaceful settlement absolutely no chance of success.

“In 1993, the group (H.A.M.A.S.) restated its vow to carry out terrorist attacks and called for boycotts and mass demonstrations. H.A.M.A.S. launched its first successful suicide bombings against Israeli civilians the following year.”¹¹⁵

For years the Israeli’s had been living with gruesome attacks on innocent people and it seemed that nothing was going to change as long as organisations such as H.A.M.A.S. existed. There will always be those opposed to a peaceful solution and extremism rose its ugly head again when Rabin was assassinated by Yigal Amir a Right Wing Israeli who opposed the signing of the Oslo Accords.

The indication that there obviously were those opposed to peace on both sides was blatant, clearly in Israeli society, and from what can be determined by Arafat’s words, so to in Palestinian leadership. Whilst there was so much hope and belief in the Accords, were they possibly deemed to failure all along because of these extremist presences that exist.

“The aspirations of the Arabs have long been viewed with suspicion by Israelis, though the beginning of the peace process in 1991 seemed to initiate a process of

¹¹⁴ Schanzer. J. “The Challenge of Hamas to Fatah” Middle East Quarterly Spring 2003. http://www.meforum.org/516/the-challenge-of-hamas-to-fatah#_ftn24 23/10/2009.

¹¹⁵ Loc. Cit

moderation of that pattern”¹¹⁶ This is a massive problem and is possibly caused by the years and years of violence and mistrust. “In the pre-Oslo period, 55 percent of those with low threat perception supported the establishment of a Palestinian state, compared with 27 percent of those who perceived high threat. In the Oslo period, fewer Israelis felt threatened and the rate of support jumped 12 percentage points to 67 percent.”¹¹⁷ It seems from the Israeli side, the strong association between violence and Palestinian’s had been ingrained.

Terrorist attacks caused by extremism causes deep fear within communities and undoubtedly has the ability to derail a peace process, simply by those that have been attacked not wanting to be attacked again. “If the victim of terrorism could have what he wanted, he would want not to have been a victim of terrorism.”¹¹⁸ This may be an obvious statement, but for Israeli’s that have been victims of terrorism, relinquishing borders and security seems like a very frightening option.

The extremism coming from the Israeli side was another major obstacle. Those on the extreme right of Israeli politics were highly opposed to a Palestinian state and giving up any territory. At this stage neither side trusted the other and were very suspicious of each others true intentions. There was no goodwill or assurance built, which is the essential element to making any negotiation work. H.A.M.A.S. in fact intensified their attacks on Israel, so in truth how could there be a peace whilst some parties were still waging war.

Shimon Peres assumed office and tried to continue the peace process. In September 1996 more problems were incurred when what was labelled "Al-Aksa tunnel riots" when false news was spread that the Israeli government opened up a tourist attraction that endangered the Al – Aksa Mosque” “This caused several days of rioting and numerous casualties.”¹¹⁹ “On January 18th 1997 Israel and the Palestinians reach

¹¹⁶ Arian, A. “Opinion Shift among Israeli Jews, 1987-2004 Variations in threat perception affect Israeli views towards a Palestinian state. “ Palestine/Israel journal Of Politics, Economics and Culture. Vol. 11, Nos 3&4, 2004/2005. http://www.pij.org/details.php?id=314_23/10/2009.

¹¹⁷ Loc. Cit.

¹¹⁸ Ochberg, F.M. And Soskis, D.A. *Victims Of Terrorism*, Westview Press. Boulder, Colorado, 1982. Pge. 120.

¹¹⁹ TimeLine of Israeli-Palestinian History and the Arab-Israeli Conflict Middle East Gateway, The Middle East. <http://www.mideastweb.org/timeline.htm> 18/102009.

agreement on Israeli redeployment in the West-Bank city of Hebron”¹²⁰ After all that was taking place the parties involved were still persistent on carrying on with the process. In October 1998 The Wye River Plantation talks began and the matters of “Israeli redeployment and release of political prisoners and renewed Palestinian commitment to correct its violations of the Oslo accords including excessive police force, illegal arms and incitement in public media and education.”¹²¹

These talks were also meant to clear up ambiguities on the “Interim Agreement”¹²² A process of clarification is a positive process but it seems that at this stage issues were being dwelled on and no substantive progress was being made. These talks were labelled as “Oslo Two” and following them came the “Sharm El Sheikh Memorandum” which again clarified all the points that had been made and tried to resolve the ambiguities that were created at the Wye Talks.¹²³ It seems like the talks were going around in circles, with the issues being addressed and re – addressed. Proper clarification and structure is essential, but it seems like other issues were also constantly being put off. There was still no agreement on Jerusalem, and no Palestinian State or clearly defined borders, without which peace could not have been achieved.

At this stage a major occurrence needed to happen and this took form in the shape of the Camp David Summit. A problem that can cause difficulties in a negotiation process is the change of leadership during the process. With the Rabin assassination, one of the leaders in hoping for Middle East Peace was taken away, and perhaps with him a large portion of the hope that was felt. He was followed by Peres and then Ehud Barak who had more of a Right Wing approach, so it may have become even more difficult for the process to follow its original plans. Another massive change that occurred was the presidency in the United States. George Bush senior was always viewed as a Palestinian sympathiser and President Clinton as more leaning towards

¹²⁰ Loc. Cit

¹²¹ Loc. Cit

¹²² Middle East Policy Council, http://www.mepc.org/resources_links/TimelinePeace.asp 18/10/2009.

¹²³ Loc. Cit

Israel's cause. Perhaps the Palestinians now had less hope for the Accords that Clinton was in power.

At the Camp David Summit "President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and P.L.O. chairman Yasir Arafat met to discuss the prospects for peace."¹²⁴ After Days of discussions and meetings the Israeli Prime Minister Barak issued his "bottom lines" that addressed the core of the issues. The Israeli's wanted "nine percent annexation in the West Bank with a one percent swap opposite Gaza.¹²⁵ The Palestinian's would get 85% of the border with Jordan" and on the issue of Jerusalem Israel was prepared to give Palestinians full control over the Muslim and Christian Quarters.¹²⁶ On issues of security he said there needed to be an Israeli presence in some areas in Jerusalem along with an international presence to ensure security for Israel. With regards to refugees he wanted a "satisfactory solution for both sides"¹²⁷ Finally it seemed that the major issues were beginning to be dealt with.

It seemed that Arafat's response to these outlines were all in negative objection. He was dissatisfied that Israel may have taken control over the 15 percent of the Jordan border, he was questioning the meaning of a satisfactory solution of the refugee crisis and the why not all of the outer neighbourhoods in Jerusalem were going to be given Palestinian sovereignty.¹²⁸ Frustration was developing all round and it seemed that patience was beginning to be lost. Major breakthroughs it could be said were made at Camp David but perhaps more negative discoveries were also exposed. The fact that from a right wing Israeli point of view it was felt that too many concessions were being made,¹²⁹ but perhaps this could have been worked around. More significantly was the notion that Yasir Arafat may possibly have been "someone not capable of doing a deal to end the conflict."¹³⁰ It may now have become clear that Yasir Arafat

¹²⁴ Loc. Cit

¹²⁵ Ross, D. Op. Cit. Pge. 688.

¹²⁶ Loc. Cit.

¹²⁷ Loc. Cit

¹²⁸ Loc. Cit

¹²⁹ Ibid. Pge. 711.

¹³⁰ Loc Cit

was never going to settle for what the Israeli's were offering. The United States offered continued "support for those who were prepared to make decisions for peace."¹³¹ The Israeli government seemed to extremely willing for this option too, but a general consensus that emerged was that Arafat was not shifting or willing to agree to anything being offered, and effectively the ideas presented at Camp David were "null and void."¹³² With the failure of talks at Camp David, the Oslo Accords ended.

MICHAEL KATZENSTEIN

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¹³¹ Ibid. Pge. 708

¹³² Loc. Cit

SUPERVISOR: LARRY BENJAMIN

**TOPIC: Valuable Lessons from two different situations:
C.O.D.E.S.A versus Oslo, could techniques from South
Africa assist conflict resolution in Israel/Palestine**

CHAPTER 3

“CO.D.E.S.A. Versus Oslo:

**The fundamentals of successful conflict resolution through
diplomacy and negotiations”**

Chapter Three

CO.D.E.S.A. Versus Oslo:

**The fundamentals of successful conflict resolution through diplomacy and
negotiations**

The situation in Israel and Palestine sees the suffering of the people of both Israel and Palestine as both populations suffer due to the constant threat of violence in the region. Whilst South Africa and her people were able to achieve peace and conflict resolution via the C.O.D.E.S.A. process, turmoil still reigns in the Middle Eastern region and the Oslo Accords that brought so much hope for peace failed in its attempts to provide relief to Israel/Palestine. Questions must be asked why was it that South Africa was able to pull itself out of the hardships while Israel and Palestine still

remain in the midst of conflict. The two resolutions that of Oslo and C.O.D.E.S.A. must be explored in order to discover reasons behind one's success and one's failure, and the possibility that valuable lessons may well be learnt by debunking and understanding the two regions and their efforts for conflict resolution.

Similarities And Differences

Many similarities can clearly be seen between the two processes, similarities that may have indicated that just like C.O.D.E.S.A., Oslo too could have been a success. However to the detriment of Oslo it was the negative differences that seemed to have overcome and ultimately resulted in the failure of the conflict resolution. There was plenty of support and belief for the Oslo Accords to be successful just as there was for C.O.D.E.S.A.

Amazingly the referendum for negotiations to continue in South Africa¹³³ and the initial figures of those supporting Oslo were both in the high sixty percent ranges.¹³⁴ There were massive hopes for the Accords to work,¹³⁵ both indicating that more than two thirds of the populations were opting for peaceful resolutions. It could be said that Oslo had more issues to overcome such as religion and vehement claims to land and territory such as Jerusalem, but it was the manner and order that these issues were addressed that perhaps caused the main problems. While those involved in the South African conflict resolution, took a more carefully paced and systematic structured manner in addressing the issues step by step. Those involved in Oslo tried to open all the issues at once which tipped the scales towards failure. It was simply too much to handle and the task was just far too great. The way it was approached was perhaps in a sense taking on too much and it simply just can not be done like that.

A massive difference between the two situations was that whilst both regions had two distinct groups trying to resolve the conflict, the conflict was resolved during C.O.D.E.S.A by a coming together as it were, under "One South Africa". For the

¹³³ Ottaway, D.B., Taylor, P. "De Klerk Receives Massive Yes Vote; South African Whites Approve Talks With Blacks." The Washington Post | March 19, 1992. <http://www.encyclopedia.com/doc/1P2-996196.html> 07/10/2009.

¹³⁴ Seliktar, O. American Jews, Israel And The Peace Process, Praeger Publishers, U.S.A. 2002. Pge. 124.

¹³⁵ Gelvin J. L. The Israel-Palestine Conflict A Hundered Years Of War. Cambridge University Press. New York 2005 Pge.179.

Israeli's and the Palestinian's, it seemed separation would be the key to possible success. It seems possibly that with separation and two states, the problems may have doubled. In Israel/Palestine, a situation that would see both parties jointly and separately catered for proved to be too big a challenge. While separation was possibly the ultimate goal for Israel and Palestine, the co - operation that was needed during the period in which these arrangements would be structured proved to be too testing for the parties involved. It was a "catch twenty two" situation; they needed to work together in order to successfully separate, but lack of trust and continued violence prevented this from happening.

Just as in South Africa there were those not opting for a resolution and did everything in their power to prevent it. So too in Israel/Palestine, there were parties against an agreement but it is felt that these parties had too much of a disruptive and destructive presence. Groups like H.A.M.A.S. it seems were able to make much more of a negative impact than groups such as the Afrikaner Weerstandsbeweging. The constant threat and security problems faced by both sides directly as a result of rouge organisations placed a constant negative force on the negotiation process.

The coalition government it could be said worked superbly during the transition process in South Africa, but a coalition government trying to control two separate peoples could not work, and whilst two separate governments was the aim, the governments continuously were suspicious of each others true intentions. The vital aspect and cornerstone was the trust that was achieved in pre negotiations in South Africa. Whether it be that that the conflict in Israel/Palestine may have had more complexities or not, the fact of the matter is that those relationships were not formed.

In South Africa the main contestation was for equal human rights, a problem that was solved by granting equality to all South African citizens. For Oslo it was not that simple and religious and historical factors caused many more complications. Jerusalem on its own presents the enormity of negotiations parallel and equal to an entire country on its own. Jerusalem needed an entire diplomacy and negotiation process dedicated to the resolving of the issues around Jerusalem. With so many sensitivities and significances for not only the Israeli's and Palestinian's but outside parties regarding Jerusalem, this city heavily contributed to the disagreements

between the parties. It could be seen from the constant disagreements at Camp David around the status of Jerusalem and future plans that the city presented a great obstacle in the way of achieving success.

The success of C.O.D.E.S.A. can also be heavily attributed to the actions of the A.N.C. and the N.P. taking control and making decisions that were followed by the other parties. In the Middle Eastern region the separatist parties never had any intention of following in the steps of those wanting peace. What could be seen in South Africa were parties like the I.F.P. that initially did not want to take part in the process, being convinced by the leaders of the two main parties that they would be catered for and that this path was in fact the best solution. The P.A.C. and A.Z.A.P.O. from the left and from the right, parties such as the A.W.B. and the Conservative party were strongly opposed to the C.O.D.E.S.A. process, but these parties were not able to prevent C.O.D.S.E.A. from being a success. Possibly because the way in which the A.N.C. and the N.P. handled the situation, by not blaming the other side but rather both parties relayed the messages to their followers that these groups were the one's that did not want a peaceful resolution and that these extreme parties were in fact the mutual enemy of both the black and white populations who wanted the same outcome, of a fair, equal and peaceful South Africa. It may also be a distinct possibility that whilst the groups opposing reform in South Africa were radicalists and vehemently did not want C.O.D.E.S.A. to work, in comparison to the extremist groups in the Middle East, their actions were not nearly as constant, nor violent. It is not only extremely difficult to reason with groups such as H.A.M.A.S. or Islamic Jihad but probably impossible to get such groups with such extreme ideologies to take part in a resolution that involves all parties. In South Africa it may have been more easily achieved to include some of the opposing groups and subdue the others, but in Israel/Palestine it can be seen that controlling extremist Islamic groups is simply impossible. Relentless attacks and messages of hatred by these extremist groups constantly presents the very real threat of violence and hatred and prevents that essential trust to be achieved.

It was known that in South Africa that if the groups that initially opposed were not included, complete success could not be achieved, and thus these groups were

directed and ultimately made part of the success. In Israel/Palestine, the same principle applied, all parties needed to be satisfied. Such extremist groups could not be directed and wanted nothing but violence. Satisfaction for these groups was not a peaceful resolution that catered for everyone but rather the elimination of Israel. The groups in both situations that had the ability to cause failure were dealt with in South Africa successfully, but unsuccessfully in Israel/Palestine. In South Africa the problems of those not wanting to cooperate were not able to cause failure, but in Israel/Palestine they were. This is due to the groups themselves and the way in which these groups were dealt with. The individuals in South Africa must be given massive substantial credit for being able to persuade the parties initially opposed, and it must be remembered that these groups were very different to those in Israel/Palestine, in sense that their popularity was not as large nor their ideologies so far imbedded into as many people.

Whilst the extremist groups may not have been dealt with as successfully as they should have been, it must be remembered that these groups are much more difficult to deal and reason with. Ultimately in South Africa these obstacles were overcome, in Israel/Palestine they were not. These extremist groups played a huge part in derailing the Oslo Accords. While there were extremist groups operating in South Africa and attacks were carried out, the amount and severity of the attacks in Israel/Palestine must be considered. These attacks were happening before the accords began and continued while the negotiations were taking place. Terror attacks that took place so often and with so much violence are extremely difficult to negotiate through or around.

The similarities could also be seen in relationships formed, such as Cyril Ramaphosa and Rouelf Meyers. Relationships were formed between P.L.O. representative Ahmed Qurei and Israeli history professor Yair Hirschfeld. Qurei and Hirschfeld made a connection and decided to meet again in what was going to be a series of 14 meetings in Oslo.¹³⁶ These relationships however were not strong enough, very possibly because of the more imminent threats of the radicalist parties. The relationships in South Africa brought a new hope but in Israel/Palestine they only seemed to cause

¹³⁶ Corbin, J. "Gaza First: The Secret Norway Channel To Peace Between Israel and the P.L.O." Pge.

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more anger amongst those who opposed the resolution who in turn used their destructive agents to prevent the process from being a success. Meetings such as these were met with outrage by the more radical parties, and again what can be seen is the presence of radical thought interfering with a process that could well have led to peace. The relationships were not allowed to be built properly perhaps because of the fires of mistrust being constantly fueled by the ideologies and messages of the extremist groups.

Both regions did have the circumstance of outside interference in terms of media portrayals but when viewing Israel/Palestine it seems that the media was and still is very focused on the negative attributes. The media is a powerful tool and when it displays the types of images it does, it makes the process more difficult to resolve as villains are constantly being created and the public is persuaded, which generally has negative effects on conflict resolution. Arab and Jewish communities around the world that see what the other side is doing to the other, causes more problems in terms that a willingness from external sources becomes less likely to see peace as a possibility.

Individual willingness is another major factor. Nelson Mandela who was imprisoned for twenty seven years showed such honour and virtue in the manner in which he acted and was almost able to single handedly set the tone for the conflict to be resolved. F.W. de Klerk too, was a stoic believer in the “New South Africa.” When looking at personalities like Yassar Arafat it is still uncertain whether he actually wanted to end the conflict. The most prominent representative of peace on the Israeli side, Yitzhak Rabin was assassinated and perhaps with him went an immense amount of belief for the process to be a success.

Positive messages from the leaders gave a sense of assurance to the nation. “Allow me to express my appreciation that we have finally been able to meet. At the very least, the simple act of our coming together at this level is bound to send a signal of hope among all South Africans. We are duty-bound not to disappoint them.”¹³⁷; The words of Nelson Mandela to the nation on the 26th of September 1992 .“The eyes of

¹³⁷ “STATEMENT BY NELSON MANDELA, PRESIDENT OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AT THE OPENING OF THE ANC/NP GOVERNMENT SUMMIT” 26 SEPTEMBER 1992 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/record.html_21/09/2009.

all of South Africa are upon us gathered here today. The future of every man, woman and child, rich or poor, educated or uneducated, will be affected decisively by our success or failure.”¹³⁸ Spoken by F.W. de Klerk 20th December 1991. These words can have prolific effect on the people and thus massively helping for the process to be successful. Perhaps these types of addresses to nations may have been missing during the Oslo Accords. It can not be said that words alone could have made the process successful, but carefully chosen words at the right time can convey messages and importance of situations as well as develop a unity and can have incredible effects.

The mixed messages that Arafat was sending out were a huge problem, but coupled with messages from individuals that were the linchpins in the pre – negotiations is extremely perplexing and provides more insight into why the process ultimately could have failed. "We are not the Israelis' policemen to arrest our own people" - refer to the Israeli demand that the Palestinians arrest terrorists.”¹³⁹ This was a statement by Ahmed Qureia in 2001, perhaps indicating that the true intention to deal adequately with one of the main causes of the conflict, that of terrorism, was never there. It also indicates that the willingness to work together was not in place, but rather the same feelings of injustice and not the attitude of not being prepared to help the cause if the requests came from the Israeli side. "We may lose or win tactically, but our eyes will continue to aspire to the strategic goal, namely, to Palestine from the river (i.e. Jordan) to the sea (i.e. the Mediterranean). Whatever we get now cannot make us forget this supreme truth." ¹⁴⁰ These words were spoken by Faisal Husseini and indicated that a negotiation was not really the ultimate goal but rather taking control over the entire region was.

These two men were the representatives who met with Yair Hirschfeld before the Oslo Accords even began. The representatives that at the time seemed that they wanted to

¹³⁸ SPEECH BY THE STATE PRESIDENT' MR F W DE KLERK, AT THE FIRST SESSION OF CODESA, WORLD TRADE CENTRE, KEMPTON PARK, 20 DECEMBER 1991 <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/transition/codesa/deklerk.html> 21/09/2009.

¹³⁹ Ahmed Qureia (Abu Ala), Palestinian parliament speaker, A.P. June 11 2001. <http://middleeastfacts.com/quotes-from-palestinian-leaders-and-media.php>

¹⁴⁰ *Ibid.* Faisal Husseini - PA Minister of Jerusalem Affairs Al-Safir (Lebanon), March 21 2001.

achieve a peace but from what can be established from their statements this may have been completely false. A major point, and the key to conflict resolution, that of that actual want and willingness to reach an agreement by all parties seems to be completely absent as indicated by the statements made by these men. Whether the intent was there during pre – negotiations seems unlikely, but it most definitely disappeared.

Whilst both situations were highly complex it must be noted that the severe wars fought between the two nations had an enormous detrimental effect on conflict resolution with regards to the Oslo Accords. It could be said that the numerous conflicts like the “Six Day War” and the Yom Kippur War were still not resolved and until the issues around those conflicts were dealt with no resolution could take place. Oslo did aim to address the issues that stemmed from these wars but they needed to be dealt with first, before issues of a new peace could be achieved, never mind issues such as sharing resources.

Perhaps a truth and reconciliation commission like South Africa had after its settlement was needed to be setup to deal with the harboured motives and feelings around the previously fought wars between Israel and Palestine before the Oslo Accords even began. A huge step in the success of C.O.D.E.S.A. was the demobilisation of the armed wing of the A.N.C. This allowed the belief that a peaceful transition could take place and was a great gesture towards the conflict resolution. In Israel/Palestine armed resistance and terrorist activity is probably one of the main causes that a peaceful solution can not be reached.

Whilst careful diplomatic skill and highly developed techniques are needed in order to successfully resolve conflicts especially with the high sensitivities involved in both South Africa and Palestine without a cooperation and willingness from all tiers ranging from the highest ranking officials to the societies and communities effected by the conflicts, resolution will not be possible.

In Chapters One and Two some of the shortcomings and the extremely effective measures were discussed. Could the difference between success and failure hinge on

the efforts and general want of those involved to bring peace. A combination of diplomatic skills and careful negotiations together with the willingness of those involved is what is needed in order to develop and succeed through diplomacy and negotiations. The parties individuals, and societies will be closely examined to discover how much of an effect these efforts had on the results between success and failure in the two respective regions.

The Upper Tier, To The Middle Tier, To the Public Tier

Firstly, what needs to be looked at are the two main parties involved in the negotiating process. Taking South Africa first, one must delve into the ideologies and the mindsets of both the ruling party at the time, The National Party and the main representative of the struggle the African National Congress. Prime Ministers Malan, Strijdom and Verwoerd were the constructors of the apartheid system, and these types of individuals were under no circumstances willing to bring about change and individuals such as these would make peaceful resolution impossible.

The National Party which ruled South Africa from 1948 until 1994¹⁴¹, whilst being the creators of the apartheid system were essential in the process to dismantle it. What can be seen from this is, that whilst the National Party effectively established apartheid, the party underwent a complete re – structure or rebirth as it were. It does make sense that as the N.P. created Apartheid they would be able to ultimately dissolve it. This process came about via the change in leadership. Whilst P.W. Botha did establish a relationship with Mandela it was de Klerk who took over the leadership of the party and revealed the complete change in ideology of the party. Whilst leading the N.P., de Klerk emphasised the notions that a free and fair South Africa was wanted by the National Party. The same could be said about the A.N.C. During apartheid, the party was regarded as a terrorist organisation as they illegally under the autocratic regime, opposed the government.

¹⁴¹ <http://www.sahistory.org.za/pages/governance-projects/organisations/NP/np-history.htm>

When Mandela was released the party's image changed from that of an armed resistance, to a willing negotiating participant. Where Mandela opted to tell his people to put down the guns,¹⁴² individuals like Arafat could rarely be seen represented without guns, and the infamous statement by Arafat of "holding an olive branch in one hand and a rifle in the other"¹⁴³ There was always the constant threat of violence stemming from the P.L.O. whilst the A.N.C. moved towards solid principles of non – violence. The comparison is not being made between the A.N.C. and the P.L.O. directly but moreover the fact that there were parties involved in each situation that were prepared and willing to completely negotiate peacefully such as the A.N.C. and parties that were not such as the P.L.O. The presence of these parties that re-affirm military tactics and violent resistant ideologies are being identified as catalysts for the breakdown of peaceful negotiations.

The two main parties in South Africa both opted for change and the leaders of the respective parties symbolised this change with their genuine rhetoric of peace and moving forward. The fundamental aspects of the parties, the very features that were based on separation and struggle between the two parties were changed to a mindset of co – operation and unity.

The change in leadership and the new leader's approaches to South Africa cascaded from the leaders to other prominent individuals within the parties and to the societies and communities, and an entire nation's way of thinking was redefined. A pronounced renewal of a political epistemology that transformed via strong leadership and genuine belief and want for change.

In Israel and Palestine it is more difficult to see these types of instrumental changes in policy. Whilst the Israeli government did accept the P.L.O., the final steps to grant a Palestinian state was never reached. The idea that the process was always on the verge could be felt with neither side seeming to take the final steps towards true recognition and acceptance. On the Palestinian side, the P.L.O. whilst seeming to making changes, the messages delivered by the leader often contradicted the apparent

¹⁴² "NELSON MANDELA'S ADDRESS TO RALLY IN DURBAN" 25 February 1990 <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/mandela/1990/sp900225-1.html> 07/11/2009.

¹⁴³ Speech of Yasser Arafat Before the UN General Assembly November 13, 1974 http://www.mideastweb.org/arafat_at_un.htm 07/11/2009.

changes that were being made. There was a lack of dedication from both sides in the Middle East in comparison to that in South Africa. In order for a peaceful outcome to be reached the ruling parties together with societies, compliance is needed but in Israel Palestine it seems the ruling parties were not setting the example needed in order to implement the changes needed in society to gain the trust to achieve a peace.

Looking at South Africa the architects of Apartheid were no longer present when the reforms began to take place. New leadership was instated that allowed for the changes to take place. Looking at Israel/Palestine Yassir, Arafat was, for decades, an individual who campaigned for the destruction of Israel, so it must be considered that while he was in power, true changes could not take place. Perhaps it was impossible to make changes for the future when such strong symbols of the past remained in power, and such pioneers for a peaceful future did not.

Both regions went through massacres and outbreaks of violence. Boipotong and Bisho could have completely destroyed the negotiation process. The riots and violence in Israel and Palestine were just as devastating. “In October 2000, a series of riots and violence in Tel Aviv and Nazareth ratcheted up the tension between Arab citizens, who participated in the violence, and Israeli citizens.” Attacks were on Israeli soldiers and citizens. Suicide bombings were carried out and over 138 suicide attacks caused mayhem and fear during the next four years. The targets were not only soldiers or political figures that were directly involved, “but pizzerias, buses, hotels, restaurants, malls, and even private homes.”¹⁴⁴

“The years between the intifadas were marked by intense diplomatic activity between Israel and Palestinians” However, during this time “suicide bombings of Israeli buses and crowded spaces were a regular tactics, particularly by Hamas and Islamic Jihad. Attacks during this period, include the Beit Lid massacre, a double-suicide bombing at a crowded junction that killed 21, and the Dizengoff Centre massacre, a suicide

¹⁴⁴ Intifada II: “The Oslo War” http://blog.standforisrael.org/issues/peace-keeping/intifada-ii-the-oslo-war_11/11/2009

bombing outside a Tel Aviv shopping mall that killed 13.”¹⁴⁵ Again it seems to come down to two principles; that of how the leaders dealt with the problem and past experience. Boipatong and Bisho were dealt with in a manner that used the violence to allow the people to see that is exactly what was not wanted, they were learning curves.

The communities were encouraged by their leaders to move forward and not let these outbreaks happen again or let them ruin the possible chance of peace. In both regions both parties suffered from these violent acts but in South Africa they seemed to bring South Africans closer together. In Israel/Palestine they drove the two peoples further and further apart and only reiterated the feelings of mistrust and proved the hardliners right, that these attacks would never stop and peace perhaps was an illusion. In the Middle East violent outbreaks and terrorist activity was just more of the same. In Israel/Palestine, the violent outbreaks could not be seen as what could happen but rather as what had been happening for years and would continue to happen.

The notion that the only way for both blacks and whites to live peacefully was to “recognise” each other and live together. As opposed to the only way to exist, was to eliminate the other. The concept that “One South Africa” where blacks and whites were equal made it almost impossible for a “war” to break out between two separate peoples as they unified and there was only one country, and a war conflict would have only had negative outcomes for both sides. Civil war was always a possibility but the leadership and change that was demonstrated prevented this.

Two separate states, that of Israel and Palestine, presented the possibility of a war between the two, a very realistic possibility. One state could not work as the two nations simply could not or did not want to live together but two states also brought difficulties. It is beginning to perhaps become more clear why one conflict was resolved and the other not. Circumstance, history, leadership, lack of truth, an

¹⁴⁵ Palestinian political violence http://wapedia.mobi/en/Palestinian_political_violence 11/11/2009.

inability to learn from past mistakes, willingness of certain parties and a true desire for change perhaps could be seen in one situation but not the other.

The instrumental notion must be remembered that Apartheid was a system setup based on economic and social beliefs. A system that was only decades old. To overcome Apartheid all that was needed was that type of archaic stereotypical thinking to be re – conceptualised which was attained via the ideas that blacks and whites could in fact live together. Looking at Israel/Palestine, what is being dealt with is thousands of years of historical significance and religious beliefs that maintained via each side's holiest scripts that the land belonged to the respective people. Religion is one of the main causes for war in the world and in Israel/Palestine, this may well be the biggest problem. It is much more difficult to restructure the thinking of religious beliefs than that of social and economic ones.

While both religions are based around the area that is Israel/Palestine and place their foundations in the land believed to be belonging to the people of each nation, how a possible peace could ever be achieved without changing the actual religions dominates the possibly blinkered viewpoints of the more fundamentalist thinkers. More moderate thinkers from both sides take the rational viewpoint that both sides can have their roots in the same place and co – exist, but those that are more fundamental believe divinely in the sole ownership of the land that is Israel/Palestine. With such enormous significance and the mindset that their religion commands it to be a certain way, it is seen why peace in this region is so difficult to achieve.

For the white population living in Apartheid, change meant accepting the rest of the population as equal and joining societies to prosper and gain global recognition and acceptance. Perhaps many Palestinians and Israelis are under the impression that complete recognition has the representations of going against their religion and thousands of years of heritage and history. From a neutral point of view it could be said, that A Palestinian State and an Israeli State living side by side would not hold such a drastic significance, and until those who believe that it does, peace can not be achieved.

Diplomacy and Negotiation processes are rarely simple or straightforward, and in particular the case of Israel/Palestine may well be one of the most testing of situations that could be encountered between parties trying to negotiate a settlement. The multitude of issues and sensitivities at hand make this situation not only extremely delicate but with a potentially highly explosive possibility that could occur at any point. Coupled with the facts that the parties involved may have also not have always been on the level or completely open and honest about their objectives, a situation is created that is extremely difficult to maneuver around.

C.O.D.E.S.A. had many sensitive issues and parties involved that may have wanted different outcomes and whilst it may be considered a huge achievement that it was carried out so successfully, it must also be noted that when comparing it with the Oslo Accords there may have been too many sensitive issues and too strong of an influence by the parties that wanted unfavourable results.

“According to Rational analysis, only the payoffs of the game should influence one’s strategy”¹⁴⁶ This presents some interesting points of thought. Firstly with regards to C.O.D.E.S.A. it was established by the majority what the payoffs were going to be. It seemed that all parties were in agreement that a non violent free and fair solution for all involved was the best outcome, so hence the payoffs seemed to be worth it and contributed to helping the negotiation process being a success. With regards to the Oslo Accords there was always a certain amount of dissatisfaction amongst the parties about the payoffs that they would receive, thus providing a de - motivation for those involved in the negotiations and causing them to fail. What must also be considered is the notion of “Rational”, and assuming that all actors are rational is a dangerous one. The fact the rationality is also a relative term must be considered. Rationally it would seem that a non violent solution to both situations would have been the best outcome, but were all involved in the negotiations, namely Oslo, rational?

¹⁴⁶ Thomson, L. *The Mind And Heart Of The Negotiator*. Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 1998. Pge. 223.

It is definitely felt that the answer to this question is at the very best inconclusive based on the actions and messages delivered by the leader of the P.L.O. and if you are not dealing with a rational actor then the entire game is changed. Religious beliefs in a negotiation process may also be a huge problem, as who can define the rationality of religions and two different religious groups trying to negotiate. Extremism and rationality are like oil and water; they simply do not mix. It can be seen that for a negotiation process to be a success a certain amount of logic and rationality must exist to tackle problems sensibly and get over obstacles in a planned manner. For C.O.D.E.S.A. this seemed to be much more likely to take place, but the elements involved in Oslo seemed to be working against a possible rational outcome. Rational for the Israeli's meant that Israel belonged to them and for the Palestinian's the same train of thought, relinquishing territory to the other side perhaps seemed irrational and trying to create peace with those that have for years experienced so much violence, is perhaps highly irrational.

The "Negotiators Dilemma" explains the idea that negotiations may be far more straight forward if the negotiators simply laid out their respective wants and gains out of the negotiation process but simultaneously this could prevent any leverage being used at a later stage by "giving away all the bargaining surplus to the other party"¹⁴⁷ When looking at the South African context this may seem not as applicable to the Israel/Palestine context. Both Mandela and de Klerk were to a certain degree aiming for the same outcome as they both had the foresight to realise that a solution that catered for both parties was the only solution that would work. There did not need to be a highly complex game of "Prisoner's Dilemma" or "Game Theory" applied as both parties had agreed what needed to be done from the outset. This made the process far more transparent and made the negotiations far more likely to succeed. C.O.D.E.S.A. became a process to fix problems that existed and could be seen to be the causes of the upheavals by the parties involved. In Israel/Palestine true intentions were never really made clear and every possible factor or area of negotiation becomes a possible negotiation tool, and a force that was used to manipulate rather than settle.

¹⁴⁷ Ibid. Pge. 62.

“If the need for negotiations is recognised and conditions are propitious, it becomes possible to discuss an agenda for talks. This means not only agreeing on what will be discussed but on the order in which the agreed items will be taken”¹⁴⁸ In both C.O.D.E.S.A. and Oslo the need for negotiations was realised by the parties involved, but by simply realising that something needs to be done about a situation by no means fixes a problematic situation. In South Africa the need to negotiate was definitely realised and the plans for the negotiations were well and truly structured that enabled issues that needed to be dealt with first in order to deal with the multitude of other issues. First it was obtained that there was support for what was taking place, then issues such as “political criminals” and homelands were dealt with. After this the concepts of governance and elections were agreed upon.

When looking at the Oslo Accords whilst it could be said that the P.L.O. and Israeli government realised the need to negotiate, again the problem of extremists who had no intention to negotiate put a massive strain on the process. Before territories were decided, the process went into delegating authority and governance that would control areas that had not yet been established. The “realisation for negotiation” is extremely important, but if the “order of items”, is just as paramount perhaps then the Oslo process did not dedicate enough time to planning the order of issues that needed to be discussed. The repercussions of not dealing with the issues of territory or Jerusalem’s status before the other areas such as co-operation in economics and energy were discussed, perhaps were not realised. There needs to be a hierarchy of needs in a negotiation process and the issues that have the ability to cause the process to collapse, need to be completely settled before other issues can be discussed.

“Diplomacy is the conduct of International Relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda, or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means such as gathering information or engendering goodwill, which are either directly or indirectly designed

¹⁴⁸ Berridge. G.R. *Diplomacy Theory And Practice* Prentice Hall Harvester Wheatsheaf, Hertfordshire, 1995. Page. 124.

to promote negotiation.”¹⁴⁹ In South Africa it could clearly be seen that the use of force or propaganda was heavily frowned upon by the leaders of both the A.N.C. and the N.P. Mandela condemned violence and urged his people not to use slogans or rhetoric that would sway people towards violence. de Klerk too, through his messages, promoted peace via talks and pointed out that those acting violently were enemies of all.

During Oslo whilst the leaders seemed to apply the same principles of non – violent activity, perhaps their messages were not strong enough as on the Israeli side assassinations and protests took place and from the Palestinians suicide attacks and violence. It still is an unknown factor whether or not both parties truly wanted peace and what covert messages may have been being sent out via other groups that could have originated from the top. The idea of goodwill and gathering information in the South African context was extraordinary. The information obtained allowed the process to continue, as the majority were found to have wanted it, and as for ambassadors of goodwill, Mandela and de Klerk set the benchmark for forgiveness trust and working together. In Israel/Palestine, whilst it seemed there was huge inclination for the accords to continue, these figures dramatically changed often due to the volume and the goodwill factor between the parties leaders was clearly lacking. Mixed messages by Arafat did not show goodwill and what can be seen is how South Africa had so many of the elements needed for a conflict to be resolved via diplomacy and negotiations. Israel/ Palestine simply did not.

¹⁴⁹ Ibid. Pge. 1.

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**TOPIC: Valuable Lessons from two different situations:
C.O.D.E.S.A versus Oslo, could techniques from South
Africa assist conflict resolution in Israel/Palestine**

Chapter 4:

“Lessons To Be Learnt”

Chapter Four:

Lessons To Be Learnt

Perhaps one of the most important notions to be established, is the fact that no two situations are ever the same. Diplomacy and Negotiations are processes which are highly fragile, potentially explosive and like the situations they try to settle and disarm are too, never the same. C.O.D.E.S.A. and the Oslo Accords were two diplomacy and negotiation tracks that aimed to resolve conflict and had many of the same problems such as two different peoples trying to co – exist, violent outbreaks and sensitive issues such as culture, race and religion, so valuable lessons may well be learnt from one to the other, but what must always be remembered that the contexts and parties involved and the general atmospheres will always differ somewhat.

When two separate nations want to share a land or are guided by phenomenal leadership to realise that sharing a land is the optimum route, it is far more obtainable to reach a solution than when two separate nations both want the same land without the others presence on that land. For South Africa the outcome was always going to be one South Africa with all races living together under one flag. This sense of togetherness creates a domain of tolerance and willingness to accept one another. For Israel/Palestine it never really was an option to have one state, not only would this not work but was simply not wanted, regardless of the fact that a proper decision on the matter was never really established. For Israelis and Palestinians there were always going to be two separate nations and most likely two separate states. A solution like that of South Africa was not a viable option for those in the Middle East, regardless of how well the diplomacy and negotiation process was structured or worked. At the very best a separation needed to take place regardless, then possibly with a unification only many years down the line.

The Apartheid system was a system that was unarguably wrong, there were no grey areas. It was simple racism and a structure that was setup to separate blacks from whites. Apartheid was created due to racism, ignorance and an irrational fear that blacks and whites could not live together. Israel and Palestine are effectively two separate regions, the stringent enforcing of borders and the wall were put in place not

because of racism or xenophobia but out of a very rational thought process to protect innocent people from terrorism. The situation in Israel is far more complex. Irresponsible comparisons that call Israel an Apartheid state are simply uneducated ill-informed propaganda to generate hate. Israel is not an apartheid state; nothing like it and the solutions that worked for the C.O.D.E.S.A. process are not the same solutions that would have worked for the Oslo Accords. Two different situations and two different negotiation processes that definatley needed different solutions, but could use some of the same techniques and ideas that may well have been helpful.

The extraordinary levels of tolerance, accepting and understanding shown by the people of South Africa, is a trait that could have brought about success in Israel/Palestine. However whilst both regions and the people underwent suffering the levels of violence and the length of the conflict made it so much more difficult for the people in Israel/Palestine to exhibit the same virtues. It can now be seen that leadership and leaders with simultaneously imposing and elegant stature are needed to direct the public towards the positive without which the negotiations can not work.

It can be seen that from the worldwide sanctions and condemnation of South Africa during Apartheid that it was universally felt that what was taking place was outright wrong. In Israel/Palestine there are sympathisers for both sides and this is genuinely appropriate. Yes it could be said that white South African's did to a certain extent suffer under Apartheid as the country had the label it did and was isolated from the international community, The non – whites were the ones that suffered the degradation and fear, and this ended as both parties decided that it was enough. Israel is a democracy and Arab Israeli citizens are treated as such and are members of Israeli society. Israeli's simply do not have the choice to completely integrate those Palestinian's that wish to work and travel to Israel into the society because of a legitimate fear of the extremists that thrive within those societies. Whichever way the scenario is broken down the main cause of the relentless conflict is stemming from extremism that refuses to allow a peace to be achieved. Nelson Mandela publicly asked for non violence and the putting down of weapons. F.A.T.A.H. is moderate and seems to be opting for peace, but the split in Palestinian society and the messages

from H.A.M.A.S. make it impossible for a peaceful settlement to be reached. Extremists present the everyday threat of violence which causes Israeli's to mistrust and have ill feelings towards the Palestinians. Israeli soldiers treat innocent Palestinians at the checkpoints terribly as they feel they can take no chances with security. H.A.M.A.S. has absolutely no mercy in their attacks and use women and children in their war against Israel. Israel is labeled as cruel as they do not allow ambulances through checkpoints, but H.A.M.A.S. uses ambulances as means of getting weapons and explosives across the border. It is a vicious circle of mistrust that needs to be eliminated starting at grassroots levels; a complete restructuring of the ideologies each of the nations has of one another. Education that provides the youth with useful information, not just messages of hate for the other. Until then no negotiation process or diplomatic activity can be a success.

Comparisons can not be made between Arafat and Hendrik Vervoerd but what can be learnt is that with leaders in place that have such firm ideologies based on separation and conflict a peaceful solution becomes impossible. P.W. Botha could not have led the N.P. through negotiations with the A.N.C. as he was a symbol of the Apartheid regime. F.W. de Klerk came into power with a fresh approach which brought a real hope for conciliation. Arafat was a symbol of violence and perhaps the negotiations were always deemed to fail with him in power. With H.A.M.A.S. being elected as the representative of the Palestinian people, there is even less hope of a peaceful outcome being achieved.

Again direct comparisons can not be made between the parties but factors can be assessed and analysed as a major problem during the Apartheid years was that of the armed wing of the A.N.C. An important point to remember is that the armed wing of the A.N.C. was only created thirty six years after the A.N.C. came into existence.¹⁵⁰ It was a last resort for the A.N.C. to try and bring about talks. For groups like H.A.M.A.S. violence is the first choice. Mandela himself did not even want an armed

¹⁵⁰ Talk Attended by Advocate Madasa A.N.C. M.P. At University Of The Witwatersrand 14/08/2009

wing and the A.N.C. did not want a “culture of radicalism”¹⁵¹ This is so important, trying to establish why one negotiation worked and the other did not. The A.N.C. “believed in the principle of co – existence”¹⁵² “Umkhonto we Sizwe” never targeted civilians, in comparison to extremist groups which in Israel/Palestine try their utmost to kill civilians. The A.N.C. removed extremist individuals who carried out attacks on civilians, whilst groups like H.A.M.A.S. praise and idolise those who kill innocent people. The A.N.C. recognised that South Africa was home to the white population just as it was to the black population and this acceptance and tolerance was the key to the resolution of the conflict.

The solution in South Africa was to find a common identity which was achieved under the “Rainbow Nation” For the Israeli’s and the Palestinian’s, there is no common identity, what is needed is separate identities, separate states and the allowance by each side to let the other live in peace. “Accepting a group does not mean that you are agreeing with the group, but it does mean you are accepting their right to exist”¹⁵³ This could clearly be seen in South Africa and the complete opposite can clearly be seen in Israel/Palestine. Are there lessons to be learnt from the South African conflict resolution for that of Israel/Palestine, yes; extremism will only cause more violence and conflict but tolerance and accepting the differences of your neighbour will prove to be priceless.

“Neither Rabin nor Arafat expended sufficient effort in rallying public support for the accords and explaining why the compromises they entailed were necessary”¹⁵⁴ Another imperative lesson to be learnt was the role of the leadership in contributing to successful diplomacy and negotiations. Perhaps Arafat and Rabin simply did not convey the messages across successfully or let the people know how important that the concessions were in the long run for peace and stability. Another possibility is that

¹⁵¹ Loc. Cit

¹⁵² Loc. Cit

¹⁵³ Loc. Cit

¹⁵⁴ Lieberfeld, D. “Promoting Tractability In South Africa and Israel Palestine, The Role Of Semiofficial Meetings.” Sage Publications. Pge. 19.

the leaders themselves did not believe in what they were doing or perhaps did not want what was taking place to be realised. Looking at Mandela and De Klerk, their messages to the nation were undeniably monumental, and the belief that a peaceful success could be achieved, and was in fact wanted, and from their words this was proved time and time again.

“An essential factor moving the two conflicts toward tractability was a change of government leadership. P.W. Botha in South Africa and Yitzhak Shamir in Israel had approached the conflicts in an ideological inflexible manner”¹⁵⁵ Another major element of successful diplomacy and negotiations is not only the willingness to adapt and be flexible but the ability to do so. In South Africa Botha surely did not have this ability but de Klerk did and so did Nelson Mandela. Rabin certainly showed all the signs of these characteristics needed to make the process a success, but with his assassination went a man on the Israeli side that may have held the key. Arafat on the other hand did not show signs of a willingness, more of a deviously expedient individual who changed his tone far too often for stability to be reached during a delicate negotiation process. All it takes is for one party or one person in a position of power to completely destroy a negotiation process. South Africa was a very unique situation in which all the leaders involved had these elements and the people supported the changes that were being implemented. In Israel/Palestine Oslo failed perhaps because of a chain reaction that began at the highest level of leadership which perhaps never fully wanted a solution that spread throughout the societies causing violence to continue and deeming the negotiations to become ineffective.

“For South Africa the crucial question was whether and how the space was to be shared between two conflicting communities”¹⁵⁶ The same principle can be applied to Israel/Palestine conflict. The difference is, that South African’s made the choice to become one community and share one land. For the Israeli’s and the Palestinians joining communities is impossibility and sharing the land is still rejected by those

¹⁵⁵ Ibid. Pge. 6

¹⁵⁶ Gideon, B. Katz, S.N. Hasenfeld Y. *Mobilizing for peace : conflict resolution in Northern Ireland, Israel/Palestine, and South Africa* Oxford University Press. 2002. Pge. 62.

opting for the hundred percentism mentality. What can be learnt from this is, that the negotiation process in South Africa worked because the people of the country chose a path to unite. This idea, at this point, can not be applied to the Israeli/Palestinian conflict as there is no desire for unification, so it must be well noted that Israel/Palestine can not find solutions to their conflict through the structure of the negotiations of C.O.D.E.S.A. but rather a solution must be found by the communities coming to a consensus of what they realistically want to achieve, just like in South Africa. The lessons to be learnt are the lessons of the willingness to adapt, the foresight for an attainable goal and an ability to create tolerance amongst diversity and allow co-existence to take place without violence.

In South Africa, what heavily contributed to the success were the factors of “projecting a vision of an alternative social order” and “promoting alternative identities”¹⁵⁷ South Africa used it’s diversity as a positive aspect and created a idea of uniqueness that South Africa was a cultural melting pot, a truly rare and exceptional place. South Africa become an example of how people could live together and pride was taken in that fact. For Israel and Palestine, the idea of alternative social order means to some that their way of life will have to be changed and this is not an option. As for alternative identity acceptance, religious extremism strictly forbids this, so it can be seen why it is so difficult for negotiations to work and why peace in that region so difficult to achieve. No matter how well structured the negotiation process is and no matter how skilled the diplomats involved in the process are, if the elements of extremism and the refusal of the people to accept a solution to conflict resolution via diplomacy and negotiations, can not be achieved, and peace and settlement can not be obtained.

The general feeling in South Africa seemed to be one that strongly wanted resolution and re-conciliation. When looking at the two situations, the non – white communities genuinely wanted to simply be equal; they openly expressed these feelings. Looking at Israel/Palestine what can see is masked individuals causing violence and mayhem.

¹⁵⁷ Ibid. Pge 232.

Questions must be asked why, and perhaps the answer is that peace is not wanted but disruption and anarchy is the rather the choice of the fundamentalists. South African's wanted to live in a free and fair society and did everything in their power to get this message across. When viewing certain groups in the Middle Eastern region, they choose to die, there is a culture of martyrdom and they kill to convey their messages which only causes more hatred and violence and refuses to allow a solution to be reached.

Perhaps it is more attainable to achieve peace when only one side has to forgive. The non – white communities of South Africa showed incredible character in moving past the events of the time. In Israel/Palestine there are two groups that are suffering and two nations that are feeling the sense of injustice, and perhaps this is another factor making it more difficult for conflict resolution to be achieved. Dennis Ross said at the Camp David summit that Arafat's entire life was about the conflict. For him to end the conflict was impossible, as it was all he had and all he knew. Looking at the leaders in South Africa, Mandela's entire life was about achieving peace and resolution, so some understanding can be taken from this as to why the two processes led to two very different paths.

Perhaps what can be learnt from the two processes is that firstly they are not the same and each situation needs a specific approach that is appropriate for the situation. What can be seen is that extraordinary leadership is vital, leadership that guides nations through the most testing of times. The fact that whilst extremism is present, conflict resolution becomes almost impossible. What can be learnt is that incredible tolerance patience and understanding is needed by all parties involved. The ability to adapt and accept is a key to unlocking the door to peace and stability. Time to forgive is essential and of utmost importance. The incredibly difficult task of putting hate and revenge aside and allowing the possibility for negotiations to work and having a true belief that the outcome may well work. What is needed is the want for peace, the need to bring resolution. Education that shows that violence and hatred have no positive outcomes, and the ability to carry on processes started by those trying to bring about

conflict resolution, learning from the past, using the experiences to move forward for the bigger picture and for the greater good of all involved.

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